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Abstract
The downward spiral of Zimbabwe under President Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the
slide into lawlessness has excited international opinion. Perhaps even more
controversial, has been South African President Thabo Mbeki's obvious reticence to
condemn Mugabe's increasing authoritarianism and breach of human rights and
democratic standards. South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has received strong criticism. Whilst both
domestic and international audiences expected South Africa to take a stronger stance
towards Mugabe because of his increasing violation of human rights and democratic
standards, President Mbeki has been notably reticent to publicly criticise Mugabe.
Consequently, the South African government has been criticised for condoning
Mugabe's behaviour, which in turn has raised questions as to South Africa's
commitment to the advocacy of human rights and its attempts to establish a leadership
position in Africa.
Although both internal and external pressures have given rise to South Africa's strong
commitment to the international norm of human rights in 1994, this commitment seemed
to weaken as the years passed. The commitment to human rights, that was especially
prominent during the Nelson Mandela presidency, has given rise to foreign policy
tensions and contradictions within the South African government. South Africa's turn to
multilateral mechanisms as the main vehicle for South Africa's principled commitment to
human rights has been accompanied by a decline in the priority placed on this principle.
This loss of ardour in the commitment to the human rights advocacy, moreover, has
seemed to increase during the Mbeki presidency. President Mbeki's desire to playa
leadership role in Africa and his vision for African renewal and rebirth have been
accompanied by a stronger emphasis on African solidarity as a foreign policy principle.
South Africa's commitment to the norm of human rights, however, has thwarted South
Africa's attempts to strengthen African solidarity since it required a rejection of the
norms of 'state sovereignty' and 'not to speak out against each other'. Since high priority
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is attached to these norms in Africa, contradictions arose between the norms of human
rights advocacy and African solidarity.
This study argues that South Africa's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe can
only be understood by focusing on the role of norms and identity on South Africa's
policy. It aims to illustrate how South Africa's aspiration for continental leadership has
constrained its commitment to human rights advocacy, as accentuated by the
Zimbabwean crisis. This study explores the role of norms and identity in South Africa's
foreign policy decisions towards Zimbabwe by drawing on constructivism as a
theoretical framework. The international relations theory of constructivism provides a
framework for analysing the potential influence of norms in international relations.
Constructivism illustrates that South Africa's freedom of action has been determined by
the interplay between policy actors and social forces with very different ideological
convictions about the country in the world, the pressures incumbent upon it and the
extent to which it can influence world affairs.
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Opsomming
Zimbabwe se toenemende ekonomiese en politieke agteruitgang onder die
presidentskap van Robert Gabriel Mugabe, asook die geleidelike oorgang na
wetteloosheid, het internasionale veroordeling voortgebring. President Thabo Mbeki van
Suid-Afrika se ooglopende teensinnigheid om Mugabe se toenemende outoriteit en
skending van menseregte en demokratiese standaarde te veroordeel, was selfs meer
omstrede. Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid van 'stille diplomasie' teenoor President
Mugabe van Zimbabwe het dus sterk kritiek uitgelok. Terwyl beide binnelandse en
internasionale sfere van Suid-Afrika verwag het om 'n sterker standpunt teenoor
Mugabe in te neem in die lig van Mugabe se toenemende skending van menseregte en
demokratiese standaarde, was President Mbeki merkbaar teensinnig on Mugabe
openlik te kritiseer. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering is gevolglik daarvan beskuldig dat dit
Mugabe se gedrag verskoon, wat weer aanleiding gegee het tot die bevraagtekening
van Suid-Afrika se verbintenis tot die bevordering van menseregte en pogings om 'n
leierskapsposisie in Afrika te vestig.
Alhoewel beide interne en eksterne druk tot Suid-Afrika se sterk verbintenis tot die
internasionale norm van menseregte in 1994 bygedra het, het hierdie verbintenis
mettertyd geleidelik vervaag. Hierdie verbintenis tot menseregte was veral prominent
gedurende die Mandela presidentskap en het spoedig aanleiding tot spanning en
teenstrydighede in Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid gegee. Suid-Afrika se wending tot
multilaterale meganismes as voertuig vir die bevordering van menseregte, het dus
gepaard gegaan met 'n afname in die prioriteit wat aan hierdie beginsel geheg word.
Hierdie afname in Suid-Afrika se dryfkrag in hul verbintenis tot die bevordering van
menseregte, het gedurende die Mbeki presidentskap vergroot. President Mbeki se
begeerte om 'n leiersposisie in Afrika in te neem, asook sy visie vir Afrika hernuwing en
herlewing, het dus gepaard gegaan met 'n sterker klem op die belang van Afrika
solidariteit as 'n buitelandse beleidsbeginsel. Suid-Afrika se verbintenis tot menseregte
het egter Suid-Afrika se pogings om Afrika solidariteit te bevorder, verhinder, aangesien
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'n verbintenis tot menseregte die verwerping van die norme van 'staatsoewereiniteit' en
'nie teenoor mekaar uit te praat nie' vereis het. Aangesien hierdie twee laasgenoemde
norme steeds voorrang geniet in die Afrika konteks, het daar teenstrydighede tussen die
norme van menseregte en Afrika solidariteit ontstaan.
Hierdie studie argumenteer dat Suid-Afrika se beleid van 'stille diplomasie' teenoor
Zimbabwe slegs begryp kan word deur op die rol van norme en identiteit op Suid-Afrika
se beleid te fokus. Daar word gepoog om te illustreer hoe Suid-Afrika se aspirasie om 'n
leiersposisie in Afrika in te neem, beperk is deur die verbintenis tot die bevordering van
menseregte, soos beklemtoon deur die krisis in Zimbabwe. Hierdie studie ondersoek
dus die rol van norme en identiteit op Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleidsbesluite teenoor
Zimbabwe met behulp van konstruktivisme as 'n teoretiese raamwerk. Die
internasionale betrekkinge teorie van konstruktivisme bied 'n raamwerk vir die analise
van die potensiële invloed van norme in internasionale betrekkinge. Konstruktivisme
illustreer dat Suid-Afrika se vryheid van aksie bepaal word deur die wisselwerking
tussen beleidsakteurs en sosiale kragte met verskillende ideologiese oortuigings oor die
staat in die wêreld, die druk wat daarop inwerk en die mate waartoe dit wêreld gebeure
kan beïnvloed.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1. Background
After South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, South Africa's foreign policy
decision-makers have been preoccupied with transformation to end its years of
international isolation (Mills, 1998: 72). This transformation was driven by both
the internal dynamic of democratisation and the changing international terrain as
brought about by the post-Cold War world and globalisation (Johnston, 2001:
11). South Africa's transition has not only constituted a change of domestic policy
and government, but also a fundamental transformation of political values, norms
and structures of authority. South Africa's transformation, moreover, compelled
the new ANC (African National Congress) government to change South Africa's
foreign policy identity from pariah state to international player.
Both internal and external expectations have given rise to a strong commitment
to the international norm of human rights. This commitment to human rights was
especially prominent during the Nelson Mandela presidency, and Mandela
stating as early as 1993 that 'human rights will be the light that guides our foreign
affairs' (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 249). This commitment to the promotion
of human rights as a guiding principle that underpins its foreign policy formation,
however, has given rise to foreign policy tensions and contradictions. Although
South Africa initially illustrated a high level of commitment to human rights, other
diplomatic concerns and obligations soon weakened this commitment. The
reaction to Pretoria's unilateral position towards the Abacha regime in Nigeria
can be highlighted as an important push towards multilateralism in the human
rights field (van der Westhuizen et al., 1998: 113).
1
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South Africa's turn to multilateral mechanisms as the main vehicle for South
Africa's principled commitment to human rights, however, has been accompanied
by a decline in the priority placed on this principle (Black, 2001: 88). This loss of
ardour in the commitment to the human rights advocacy has seemed to increase
during the Mbeki presidency. President Mbeki's desire to playa leadership role in
Africa, as has been exemplified by South Africa's commitment to the African
Renaissance and Nepad, has however brought some foreign policy
contradictions to the fore. Mbeki's vision for African renewal and rebirth has been
accompanied by a stronger emphasis on African solidarity as foreign policy
principle. South Africa's commitment to the norm of human rights, however, has
thwarted South Africa's attempts to strengthen African solidarity.
The current crisis in Zimbabwe, as well as Mbeki's reticence to condemn
President Mugabe's increasing violation of human rights and democratic
standards, have highlighted the contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy.
Whilst South Africa has illustrated a commitment to human rights, their refusal to
publicly condemn Mugabe's behaviour has refuted this commitment. The recent
controversy surrounding Zimbabwe's continued suspension from the
Commonwealth in December 2003 (New African, 425: 20-22), and Mbeki's
appeals to end this suspension, have raised questions about South Africa's
foreign policy identity.
A deeper understanding of South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy'
towards Zimbabwe cannot be gained by focusing on material interests alone.
Rather, attention must be given to the importance of norms and identity in
international relations and its influence on foreign policy identity. The
international relations theory of constructivism provides a framework for
analysing the potential influence of norms in international relations. It is within
this framework that South Africa's attempts to act as 'agent' and 'norm leader' in
Africa by promoting human rights and democracy, and its desire to play a
leadership role in Africa, must be understood. Constructivism illustrates that
2
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'I'
South Africa's freedom of action has been determined by the interplay between
policy actors and social forces with very different ideological convictions about
the country in the world, the pressures incumbent upon it and the extentto which
it can influence world affairs (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 448).
1.2. Rationale I theoretical framework
This study uses constructivism as a theoretical framework in order to gain a
deeper understanding of South Africa's foreign policy decisions towards
Zimbabwe. Unlike the international relations theoretical frameworks of neo-
realism and neo-liberalism, constructivism does not focus on material interests
alone, but highlights the influence of norms and identity on foreign policy
decisions. South Africa's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe and
Mbeki's reticence to condemn Mugabe's behaviour, moreover, can only be
understood by recognising the influence and pressures of norms and identity on
South Africa's commitment to human rights. South Africa's aspiration to playa
leading role in the continent, has also involved issues surrounding the norms of
African solidarity and sovereignty, as well as 'not to speak out against each
other'.
Constructivists's emphasis on the potential for dynamism and change in the
international system by focusing on ideational power (van der Westhuizen, 2004:
3) is thus of value in providing an explanation of the changed environment in
which South Africa found itself after the demise of apartheid.
South Africa's posturing as middle power after 1994, is also illustrative of the
multiple pressures bearing upon South Africa both from within its own state-
societal complex as well as from its position within the current world order. South
Africa's realisation that domestic reconstruction and development can only be
addressed if it works within the existing configuration of global economic power
(van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 450), strengthened its resolve to assume a middle
3
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power role. This position enabled South Africa to build bridges of understanding
between the Northern developed states and the Southern developing states, and
illustrated the significance of this middle power position for South Africa's foreign
policy.
1.3. Literature Review
The literature on South Africa's foreign policy has grown considerably in recent
years, largely because of South Africa's enhanced international profile since its
political transformation in 1994. Whilst Mills' (1994) edited collection of articles
From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994
largely provided a historical and descriptive overview of South Africa's foreign
policy, Schraeder (2001) highlighted the lack of consistency within the foreign
policymaking process in the early post-apartheid years.
Spence, Johnston and Hamill in Broderick, Burford and Freer's (eds.) (2001)
South African Foreign Policy: Dilemma's of a New Democracy, respectively
provided a critical discussion of the role of the aspirational commitment to human
rights in post-apartheid foreign policy, as well as of the foreign policy challenges
that South Africa's position as regional superpower presented to the government
after 1994. The contribution of Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan in Broderick et
al.'s (2001) edition further illuminated this regional hegemonic role of South
Africa.
President Mbeki's leadership role in championing the African Renaissance and
the advocacy of Africa's sustainable development through Nepad, has also given
rise to a significant growth in literature on South Africa's foreign policy by authors
such as Cornwell (1998), and Ramose (2000). South Africa's membership of the
new African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC), has
contributed to this attention in South Africa's foreign policy. Authors such as
4
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Taylor (2002b), and Olivier (2003) have followed a more critical approach to
South Africa's leadership role in Africa.
In South Africa's Emergence as Middle Power, van der Westhuizen (1998)
scrutinised South Africa's emergence as a 'middle power' in the global political
economy, whilst Nel (1998) and Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (2000)
further explored this theme. These authors focused on the normative
underpinnings of South Africa's gravitation towards multilateral diplomacy. Maxi
Schoeman (2000) also critically questioned South Africa's status as 'emerging'
middle power, and the implications thereof on South Africa's foreign policy.
Chitityo (2004) and Mayo (2000) have contributed to the growing body of work
written about the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe. Authors such as Taylor (2002a)
and McLean (2002, 2003) have provided critical analyses of the impact of the
Zimbabwean crisis on the Southern African region and the impact thereof on the
credibility of Nepad's African Peer Review Mechanism. Despite contributions by
van der Westhuizen (2004) concerning the role of norms in the acceptance of the
African Peer Review Mechanism, there has been no study on the influence of
norms and identity on South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The
tension between South Africa's commitment to human rights on the one hand,
and African solidarity on the other, has been neglected in analyses of South
Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe.
Due to this lack of research concerning the role of norms and identity on South
Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, and the contradictory nature of its
commitment to the norms of human rights and African solidarity, this study has
the potential to highlight the important role that these norms have played in South
Africa's foreign policy decision-making. In this way this study can contribute to
enhance a better understanding of South Africa's policy of 'quiet diplomacy'
towards Zimbabwe. Constructivism, as conceptualised by Onuf (1998) and
5
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Kowert in Kubálková, Onuf and Kowert (1998), will be used as a framework to
examine the influence of norms on South Africa's foreign policy.
1.4. Problem Statement
South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe has given
rise to a fierce debate regarding Mbeki's reticence to condemn Mugabe's
increasing breach of human rights and democratic standards. The South African
government has been criticised for condoning Mugabe's behaviour, which in turn
has raised questions as to South Africa's commitment to the advocacy of human
rights and its attempts to establish a leadership position in Africa.
Up to this point in time, however, the debate surrounding South Africa's policy of
'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe has neglected to identify the influence of
issues surrounding identity and norms on South Africa's foreign policy decisions.
South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, however, cannot be understood
by focusing on material interests alone, but the role of norms and identity on
South Africa's policy must be examined.
The aim of this study, therefore, is two-fold. On the one hand it aims to illustrate
how South Africa's aspiration for continental leadership has constrained its
commitment to human rights advocacy, as accentuated by the Zimbabwean
crisis. On the other hand this study explores the role of norms and identity on
South Africa's foreign policy decisions by drawing on constructivism as a
theoretical framework.
1.5. Conceptualisation of constructivism as a theoretical framework
Theory is viewed as systematic, formal explanations of processes, behaviour and
patterns of change that helps one to make sense of the world (Nel & McGowan,
6
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1999: 51). Theory is useful in the sense that it helps one to understand or predict
events in the real world (Sprout & Sprout, 1962: 40; Toma & Gorman, 1991: 50).
It is important to recognise that 'theory is always for someone and for some
purpose', as suggested by Cox (1981: 128). Cox (1981: 128) argues that since
all theories derive from a position in social and political time and space, there is
no such thing as theory in itself, but that it is always related to a specific
standpoint in time and space. Any theory that represents itself as divorced of
time and space should therefore be examined as ideology and its concealed
perspective should be uncovered. The primary task of theory, therefore, is to
become clearly aware of issues that present themselves to consciousness as
problems. Cox (1981: 128) highlights consequently that theory must be able to
adapt old concepts or to reject them as the reality changes. New concepts must
be forged in an initial dialogue between the theorist and the particular world that
is trying to be comprehended. Social and political theory is thus history-bound at
its origin, since it is always traceable to a historically-conditioned awareness of
certain problems and issues.
Theory can serve two distinct purposes. It can either serve as a guide to help
solve the problems within the terms of the particular perspective that was the
point of departure (problem-solving theory), or it can be more reflective upon the
process of theorising itself (critical theory). In this way the purpose of theory is to
become clearly aware of the perspective that gives rise to theorising and its
relation to other perspectives. It also opens up the possibility of choosing a
different valid perspective (Cox, 1981: 128; Leysens, 2002: 129).
After the Second World War, there has been no agreement over what exactly the
'right' theory of international relations is and whether such a theory exists.
Although the theoretical debate surrounding international relations used to be
dominated between realists and liberalists, with the end of the Cold War it
became clear that these two theoretical approaches were no longer able to
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provide a satisfactory explanation of the international order (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998: 888).
It is within this context that constructivism, with its emphasis on norms and ideas,
stepped forward. Despite attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to build a science of
politics modelled on economics or natural sciences, it was not able to displace
these normative and ideational concerns completely. In the 1980s constructivism
illustrated that norm research was able to provide explanations of puzzles in
international politics that other approaches had been unable to explain
satisfactorily. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism were unable to explain change in
the international system, such as the end of the Cold War. These approaches,
moreover, are unable to cope with the issues presented by events such as
September 11, 2001 and the rising importance of identity in world politics.
Constructivism, on the other hand, focuses on the way in which norms
themselves change, as well as the way in which norms change other features in
politics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 888). By developing a constructivist
argument, Wendt (1992: 132) has attempted to build a bridge between the
traditions of realism and liberalism. Constructivism involves a 'sociological social
psychological' form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the
dependent variables. According to Wendt (1992: 129) the debate between neo-
realists (structure) and neo-liberals (process) has been based on a shared
commitment to 'rationalism' and has re-emerged as an axis of contention in
international relations theory. Whilst structure involves anarchy and the
distribution of power, process has to do with interaction and learning. The debate
between neo-realists and neo-liberals revolves around the extent to which state
action is influenced by structure (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus
process (interaction and learning). Identities and interests of agents are treated
as exogenously given and these approaches focus on how the behaviour of
agents generates outcomes. Whilst questions concerning behavioural change
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are tolerated, questions concerning change in identity and interests are ignored
(Weber, 2001: 62).
1.5. 1. Constructivism as a theory of international relations
Constructivism, as formulated by Nicholas Onuf (1998:58) provides an ontology
of the functioning of the social world. Onuf emphasises the social nature of
human beings and the way in which humans are constructed by the relations in
which they are involved. He also highlights the importance of language since
talking is the most important way in which the world is constructed. Saying, in
other words, is doing (Onuf, 1998: 59). The nature of international relations is
thus determined by the interaction between states, since states are viewed as
the most important actors in international relations. In turn, this constructed world
influences states, and reality is made through a process of reciprocal
construction. In this process, rules (norms) bind states and the world (Onuf,
1998: 59).
A norm is defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a shared
identity. Norms channel and regularise behaviour and often limit the range of
choice and thus constrain actions. Norms are used to describe collective
expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity. These
standards of 'proper' or 'appropriate' behaviour, thus involve intersubjective
meaning (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 890-894). According to Katzenstein
(1996b: 5), norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor in some
situations. In this way the norms have 'constitutive effects' that specify what
actions will cause relevant others to recognise a particular identity. In other
situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an
already defined identity. In these instances, norms have 'regulative effects' that
specify standards of proper behaviour. Norms, in other words, either define
standards of appropriate behaviour that shape interests and help coordinate the
behaviour of political actors (regulative norms), or express actor identities that
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also define interests and thus shape behaviour (constitutive norms). Political
interests are defined by both regulatory and constitutive norms, and by a norm of
collective identity (Katzenstein, 1996a: 18-19).
Norms make not only cognitive but also behavioural claims on individuals and
can thus affect behaviour in both a direct and indirect manner. Norms have a
direct effect by defining collectively shared standards of appropriate behaviour
that in turn validate social identities. Rather than specifying the end of actions,
norms shape behaviour by offering ways to organise action. They create habits
of interpretations and repertoires of practice that are grounded in experience
(Katzenstein, 1996a: 18-19). Norms, however, do not float freely in political
space but acquire particular importance when they crystallise through
institutionalisation. Once institutionalised, norms are collectively held and exist
external to actors. This institutionalisation creates a degree of stability and
uniformity that might otherwise be lacking (Katzenstein, 1996a: 21).
Constructivism, therefore, takes as starting point that the world is constructed
and not a given reality. According to this approach, the world is determined by
the way in which it is viewed in a specific period and a specific space or context.
Consequently, international structure is determined by the international
distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate
behaviour give the world order, structure and stability. The way in which the
world is viewed, moreover, can change since it is based on norms. Accordingly,
idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation and
change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 894). The constructivist position holds that
agents and structures constitute the other. Agents and structures thus
simultaneously enable and constrain each other (Gould, 1998: 80).
States have relatively more agency under constructivism than under neo-realism
or liberalism. This agency, however, is not unconstrained but choices are
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rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the practices, identities
and interests of other actors that prevail in particular contexts (Hopf, 1998: 177).
1.5.2. Intersubjectivity, identities and interests in world politics
Although interest in the contribution of identity to international politics is not new,
the growth of interest in identity politics has continued unabated since the end of
the Cold War. In the absence of such well-defined ideologies that were prevalent
during the Cold War, identity has become less certain. Distinguishing the self
from the other in many different social levels, has therefore presented a greater
challenge in the post-Cold War period (Kowert, 2001: 268-269).
Constructivism brings a shift from capabilities (as emphasised by neo-realists) to
identity. This shift moves the focus from what states can do due to their position
in a structure, to what they want to do because of how they see themselves in
relation to others. Onuf (Kowert, 2001: 280-281) points out that 'interests are
recognisable to us as the reasons we give for our conduct'. Interests, therefore,
are expressed as foreign policies in the case of national interests. Policies are
thus declarations of an agent's intentions presumed to be linked to that agent's
interests. As explained by Kowert (2001: 281), however, foreign policy
declarations do not necessarily represent an agent's interests. It is for this reason
that the study of identity becomes important. Identity stands in for interest and
describes the basis for our assumption that an agent's policy statements reveal
(or obscure) intentions. Identity is thus central to foreign policy choices and is the
medium through which national leaders and ordinary citizens translate
recognition of similarity and difference into ontological statements about
international relations.
Constructivism (Kowert, 1998: 103-104), therefore, suggests that social structure
on its own cannot serve as a basis for a complete account of identity. Agents and
behaviour must also be considered when giving an account of identity. Kowert
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(1998: 103) maintains that constructivism provides an important link across levels
of analysis. Cognitive bias does not only shape the identities of other people, but
biases the functioning of language to create identities at every level of human
relations. Agents at all levels are thus made meaningful because individuals
confer identity on themselves and on the institutions that represent them.
Constructivism has a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which
identities and interests are endogenous to interaction. Meaningful behaviour or
action is only possible within an intersubjective social context and collective
meaning constitute the structures that organise people's actions (Wendt, 1992:
135). Constructivism holds that actors develop their relations with, and
understanding of, others through norms and practices. Norms give meaning to
actions and structure derives meaning from an intersubjective set of norms and
practices. States form an understanding of self and others through interaction
and the self is therefore a reflection of an actor's socialising. This process of
interpretation and reactions creates intersubjective meaning. The first social
action between agents creates expectations on both sides about each other's
future behaviour. If these actions are repeated enough times, relative stable
concepts of the self and the other are formed. This reciprocal interaction creates
enduring social structures, in terms of which identity and interests are defined
(Wendt, 1992: 139).
According to constructivism, identities are relatively stable, role-specific
understandings about self. Actors acquire identities by participating in collective
meanings. As such, identities are inherently relational. Peter Berger (Wendt,
1992: 135) claims that 'identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological
reality, is always identity within a specific, socially, constructed world'. A state,
therefore, may have multiple identities as 'sovereign', 'regional superpower' and
so on. Hopf (1998: 194) asserts that constructivism's expectation of multiple
identities for actors in world politics rests on an openness to local historical
context. Constructivism does not rest on pregiven assumptions of identity. Wendt
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(1992: 135) maintains that although the commitment to and salience of different
identities vary, 'each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor
grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and
each other and which constitute the structure of the social world'.
Hopf (1998: 175) asserts that the identity of a state implies its preferences and
consequent actions. Identity forms the basis of interests and is always a process.
Interests are therefore defined in the process of defining situations and are the
product of identity. Others are understood according to the identity a state
attributes to them. Simultaneously, a state reproduces its own identity through
daily social practice. It is important to realise that the producer of identity is not in
control of what it ultimately means to others. Meaning is obtained. through
intersubjective structure.
In both international and domestic society, identities are necessary in order to
ensure some minimal level of predictability and order. Relatively stable
intersubjective identities are required to form durable expectations between
states and to ensure predictable patterns of behaviour (Hopf, 1998: 175). Ted
Hopf (1998: 175) suggests that identity performs three necessary functions in a
society. Identity tells you and other who you are, and it tells you who others are.
Thirdly, in telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of
interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in specific areas, and
with respect to particular actors (Hopf, 1998: 175).
Wendt (Kowert, 1998: 102) proposes that the structural context of state
interaction, and systemic factors such as independence and the transnational
convergence of domestic values all contribute to the formation of collective
identities. Although norms are not static, it is important to note that collective
identities are not easily changed. History and institutions prohibit that norms
change all the time in response to push-and-pull factors. Institutionalised, taken-
13
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
for-granted norms limit the range of choice at any given time (Katzenstein,
1996a: 3).
1.5.3. Connecting domestic and international norms
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) state that norms as shared assessments
raise the question of how many actors must share the assessment before it can
be called a norm. They assert that norms are 'continuous, rather than
dichotomous entities' and that they 'come in varying strengths' with different
norms commanding different levels of agreement. A norm may be regional, for
instance, but not global. Other norms, such as human dignity, however, are
global norms. The dynamics of this agreement process can be better understood
by examining the 'life cycle' of norms. Agreement among a critical mass of actors
on an emerging norm can create a tipping point after which agreement becomes
widespread (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 892).
Since domestic norms are deeply intertwined with the workings of international
norms, many international norms begin as domestic norms and become
international through the efforts of 'norm entrepreneurs'. Domestic norm
entrepreneurs that advocate a minority position, can on the other hand, use
international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates. A two-level
norm game thus occurs where the domestic and international norm tables are
increasingly linked (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 893).
Norm influence, or the norm life cycle can be understood as a three-stage
process. Norm emergence constitutes the first stage and persuasion by norm
entrepreneurs is the characteristic mechanism of the first stage. During this stage
norm entrepreneurs attempt to persuade a critical mass of states (norm leaders)
to embrace new norms. During the second stage norm leaders attempt to
socialise other states to become norm followers. A combination of pressure for
conformity and a desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem give rise to
14
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this stage where the norm 'cascades' through the rest of the population. The last
stage is characterised by norm internalisation. Norms acquire a taken-for-granted
quality and are no longer a matter of public debate. Internalised norms may
eventually become the prevailing standard of appropriateness against which new
norms emerge and may even compete for support (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:
895).
It should be noted, however that the completion of the life cycle is not an
inevitable process and that many emergent norms fail to reach a tipping point.
Norms are actively built by agents that have strong notions about appropriate or
desirable behaviour. Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence since
they call attention to issues or even create issues by a process called 'framing'
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 897).
A norm reaches a threshold or tipping point after norm entrepreneurs have
persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new
norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) state that although it is difficult to give
a theoretical account to explain why norm tipping occurs, they suggest that norm
tipping rarely occurs before one-third of the total states in the system adopt the
norm. The adoption of a norm is also influenced by which states adopt the norm.
'Critical states' are those states without which the achievement of the substantive
norm goal is compromised.
After the tipping point of norm cascading has been reached, more countries
begin to adopt new norms rapidly, even without domestic pressure for such
change. Norm cascading is promoted by an active process of international
socialisation that is intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that states comply with norms in this
stage for reasons that relate to their identities as members of an international
society. It is recognised that state identity fundamentally shapes state behaviour
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and that state identity is in turn shaped by the cultural-institutional context within
which states act.
Little attention, however, is given by literature when a new norm is contradictory
with an 'older', established norm. Such is indeed the case in Africa, as will be
argued in the conclusion. The 'new' norm of human rights requires states to
accept the norm of state interference in the case of human rights violations. In
the African context, however, high priority is attached to state sovereignty, and
therefore foreign intervention in the name of human rights has been viewed as
unwarranted interference in states' domestic affairs. Establishing the norm of
human rights, moreover, requires states to 'speak out against each other', which
is not normally done in Africa. In the view of these contradictions, it is argued that
a new rising norm such as human rights may in fact be compelled to take a
backseat as more priority is attached to older, established norms such as state
sovereignty and 'not to speak out against each other'.
1.6. Research methodology and limits of the study
This is a qualitative study and is based on a theoretically-informed content
analysis, and on primary and secondary sources of information. Whilst research
was mainly conducted by means of secondary sources, primary sources such as
statements and publications by the South African government have been used as
well. Secondary information was gathered by investigations of academic journal
articles, books, publications, newspaper articles, media reports and other
relevant literature.
This study presents a comprehensive literature review by means of secondary
sources dealing with the changing nature of South Africa's foreign policy agency
in the post-apartheid period, the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the international
relations theory of constructivism. The value of the study is also enhanced by
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using Zimbabwe as case study to highlight the contradictions inherent in South
Africa's commitment to human rights and African solidarity.
An important limit to the study is that the analysis of South Africa's foreign policy
identity and decisions are limited to a specific period, namely 1990-2003. Due to
the sensitivity of the Zimbabwean issue, moreover, South African government
publications regarding its Zimbabwean policy have been limited. The veil of
secrecy surrounding South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has also
hindered access to information regarding the South African government's
objectives of its policy of quiet diplomacy. A broader, more comprehensive study
with a longer time period allowed for research, will enhance the quality and depth
of the study.
1.7. Overview of study
This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one stipulates the aim of the
study, provides a rationale for the study, and identifies limits to the study. It also
constructs a theoretical framework for analysing South Africa's foreign policy
towards Zimbabwe. This chapter conceptualises the international relations theory
of constructivism that is used as framework in this study and highlights the role of
norms and identity in foreign policy decision-making.
Chapter two identifies the main foreign policy trends in South Africa during the
period 1994 to 2003. A chronological framework is used in this chapter to
highlight the Mandela presidency's initial moral aspirationalism, and how
elements of realpolitik compelled the South African government to dilute its
commitment to the norm of human rights. This chapter illustrates how the loss of
ardour in South Africa's commitment to human rights was continued during the
Mbeki presidency, and how President Mbeki's aspiration for continental
leadership gave rise to a commitment to African solidarity. These commitments
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to human rights and African solidarity, however, gave rise to a contradiction in
South Africa's foreign policy.
Chapter three highlights Zimbabwean president Mugabe's increasing
authoritarianism and breach of human rights and democratic standards by
providing a brief overview of Zimbabwe's economic and political decline since
1980. Chapter three also conceptualises South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, and illustrates the influence of the contradictory
norms of a commitment to human rights and African solidarity on South Africa's
foreign policy decisions. The international and domestic outcry against Mbeki's
refusal to publicly criticise Mugabe's behaviour is discussed, as well as the
criticism targeted against Mbeki's policy of quiet diplomacy.
Chapter four provides the conclusion, and uses constructivism as a tool to
highlight the influence of the contradictory norms of a commitment to human
rights and African solidarity on South Africa's foreign policy decisions.
18
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter Two
South Africa's foreign policy in the post-apartheid years: 1994-
2003
2.1. Introduction
South Africa's transition to a democratic society has been celebrated as 'one of
the most extraordinary political transformations of the twentieth century' (Ie Pere
& van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 249). The 'new' South Africa emerged at a crucial
juncture in international relations and in global developments, and this transition
coincided with momentous changes and upheavals in the international arena.
With the end of the Cold War, international relations changed from the relative
simplicity of the East-West struggle to a complex, interdependent and fast-
changing environment (Mills, 2000: 256). The fall of the Soviet Union, the end of
the Cold War ideological divide and the increasing prominence of the North-
South divide were features of this changing global landscape with which South
Africa had to deal after its transformation (Ie Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 1999:
249).
From 1948 to 1994, South African foreign policy sought to justify and protect its
authoritarian apartheid political system. Racial segregation was imposed on a
politically disenfranchised black majority that led to the branding of South Africa
as an international pariah within the African continent and the wider international
community. This pariah status ended in 1994 with South Africa's first multiracial,
multiparty democratic elections (Schraeder, 2001: 230). After South Africa's first
democratic election in 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been preoccupied
with transformation to end its years of international isolation (Mills, 1998: 72).
This transformation was driven by both the internal dynamic of democratisation
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and the changing international terrain as brought about by the post-Cold War
world and globalisation (Johnston, 2001: 11). Since increasing South Africa's
isolation through non-governmental relations formed a key pillar of the ANC's
attempt to end apartheid, it was expected that the 'new' South Africa would be
able to play a dramatically improved, more positive, international role (Mills,
1998: 72).
The ANC's new foreign policy orientation signified a complete break with the
apartheid past and acknowledged acceptance of, and signified a willingness to
work within, the prevailing global order (Evans, 1996: 259). Van der Westhuizen
et al. (1999: 111) assert that because South Africa was unable to draw on the
kind of resources, expertise and accumulated experience that countries with
longstanding traditions of multilateral engagement had, 'learning how to swim in
the deep end became the rule, rather than the exception'. Consequently, South
Africa's foreign policy was criticised for being 'ad hoc', 'uncoordinated', 'erratic'
and 'unpredictable' (van der Westhuizen et al., 1999: 114). These terms have
demonstrated a transitory phase in which South African foreign policy has
gradually moved away from 'heroism' towards a more 'routine' orientation".
Multilateralism as a 'safer' diplomatic option was emphasised (van der
Westhuizen et al., 1999: 114), as will be discussed later in this chapter.
South Africa's escalating multilateral international engagements can be gauged
according to four roughly distinguishable periods. The first period from 1994 to
early 1996 can be seen as the 'heroic' early days, whilst 1996 and 1997 were
viewed as the days of uncertainty and recalibration (van der Westhuizen et aI.,
1998: 113). A more 'routine' and established multilateral orientation was started
under Mandela's presidency in 1998 and enhanced under Mbeki's reign in 1999.
In late 1999 and 2000, a return was made to a somewhat 'heroic' orientation
when Mbeki launched his multilateral drive to counter the marginalisation of
9 See Cooper (1997: 9-20) for a discussion of this range between 'heroic' approaches and
'routine' approaches to policy-making.
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Africa in the global political economy. It is within this context that the structure of
South Africa, as well as the evolution of South African agency in the post-1994
period, must be understood (Black, 2001: 88).
The 'heroic' days of the early Mandela administration, illustrated a strong
commitment to the promotion of human rights. As the years progressed,
however, the ANC government seemed to lose ardour in their commitment to
human rights. This tendency was continued in the Mbeki administration and his
aspiration for continental leadership gave rise to a commitment to African
solidarity. As will be illustrated in this chapter, these two norms of human rights
promotion and African solidarity, however, proved to be incompatible within the
African context. The crisis in Zimbabwe, moreover, accentuated the
contradictions between the norms of a commitment to human rights and African
solidarity.
2.2. The Mandela years: 1994-1999
Since February 1990, the De Klerk government was determined to reintegrate
South Africa into the global political economy by liberalising South Africa's
domestic political and economic orders. During its final years of minority rule,
South Africa largely succeeded to end its enforced international .isolation
(Vickers, 2003: 75). Vickers (2003: 75) maintains that South Africa was able to
re-establish normal trade, investment, cultural, sporting and diplomatic relations
with many states after 1990. It was only after the inauguration of the ANC in
1994, however, that South Africa could reach its full foreign policy potential.
South Africa's creation of a democracy, ties forged between the ANC's leaders in
exile and those in neighbouring countries, and President Mandela's moral
authority, allowed the ANC to advance the regional confidence-building process
to a level which was beyond De Klerk (Hamill, 2001: 30).
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In 1992, the ANC leaders ended their long-standing commitment to liberation
politics and began the process of policy convergence and formulation. As leader
of the ANC, Nelson Mandela identified six assumptions in a 1993 article in
Foreign Affairs that would underpin the future foreign policy of South Africa
(Mandela, 1993). These assumptions were going to rest on the belief in:
• The centrality of human rights to international relations that will extend
beyond the political to include economic, social and environmental
dimensions.
• The promotion of democracy world-wide as presenting the only lasting
solutions to the problems of humankind.
• Justice and respect for international law as guide for the relations between
nations.
• Peace as a goal to which all nations should strive through agreed non-violent
mechanisms.
• The centrality of Africa in South Africa's foreign policy.
• Economic development that is dependent on growing regional and economic
co-operation in an interdependent world.
These assumptions have been rooted in the notion of the primacy of domestic
policy and the belief that national interest, if it is properly envisaged, 'can sit
comfortably with the international interest' (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 442).
Whilst this publication was highly pragmatic and recognised the reconstruction
and development challenge that faced the new South Africa, the ANC sought to
balance these statist imperatives with a strong aspirational commitment to the
norms of democracy and human rights (Vickers, 2003: 77).
South Africa's post-apartheid diplomatic culture reflected the fragmented
divisions within its state-societal complex. A division existed between an
'internationalist' and 'neo-mercantilist' camp. The latter group mostly consisted
out of the ancien régime and emphasised the importance of trade and self-
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interest. The internationalists, on the other hand, were in favour of a greater
degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing world. This
group, of whom many had been exiles during the apartheid regime, wanted
South Africa to take a much more principled stand on issues such as human
rights in its international affairs. They believed that apartheid compelled nations
to adopt a standard beyond self-interest in their relations towards the apartheid
government. This required, in other words, the willingness to sacrifice economic
and other gains to a higher morality (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 444).
This tension between the neo-mercantilists and internationalists was also
illustrated by the conflicting interests that developed between the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) during the
early years of South Africa's transformation. After 1994, the DTI emerged as the
chief steward of South Africa's bilateral and multilateral trade diplomacy. Tension
arose between prioritising the perceived commercial, trade and political interests
of the DFA and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global human
rights and democracy (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 253; Ryall, 1997: 399).
Following the April 1994 elections, the ANC was thus faced with the task of
translating the gains of liberation diplomacy into a pragmatic and principled
foreign policy for South Africa (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 250). Since the
blueprints of the ANC, however, focused more on ideals and orienting concepts
than in frameworks for implementation and definitions of strategic visions, the
ANC had to embark on a steep learning curve once it assumed office. It was
necessary to increase pragmatism in the formulation of its foreign policy in order
to move beyond an avowed set of aspirational principles and to manage key
dimensions of a complex global order in a strategic way (Spence, 2001: 5).
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2.2.1. Morality, human rights and democracy
The promotion of human rights and democracy developed as one of the most
consistent themes of South Africa's new foreign policy elite in the years following
the democratic transition (Black, 2001: 76). South Africa's new foreign policy
ideals were grounded on the commitment to human rights, democracy and
majority rule. Already in 1993, Mandela asserted that 'human rights will be the
light that guides our foreign affairs' (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 249). The
ANC government's attempt to give an ethical dimension to South Africa's foreign
policy aspirations is not surprising, given the fact that the 'new' South Africa was
in part 'the creation of a massive human rights campaign waged on behalf of the
deprived black majority' (Spence, 2001: 4). After the political transformation,
moreover, it was widely assumed that South Africa had a special opportunity and
obligation to provide leadership internationally on human rights issues (Black,
2001: 76).
The South African Government's Discussion Document of September 1996 on
foreign policy refers to democracy and human rights as 'fundamental principles',
'pillars on which South Africa's foreign policy rests' and 'underlying principles
which serve as guidelines in the conduct of foreign relations'. Little guidance is
however provided as to the reasoning behind the centrality of these principles
and only an instrumental explanation is given for the centrality of human rights
and democracy: 'International organisations and governments all over the world
increasingly place a high premium on the performance of countries and
governments in these areas. Development assistance is, in many cases, linked
to democratisation programmes, the observance of human rights and the
exercise of good government' (Johnston, 2001: 24).
Anchoring its concern for human rights in either national interest or normative
terms (Johnston, 2001: 13-24), however, is of strategic importance to South
Africa, given the urgent socio-economic demands domestically and the need to
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justify the relevance of human rights in a country where a large part of the
population is struggling to meet basic needs (Black, 2001: 81). This commitment
of resources to goals which are not always morally clear and whose pursuit rarely
brings quantifiable results, has created tension in South Africa (Johnston, 2001:
18). The usefulness of spending precious, limited national resources on costly
foreign policy initiatives has been questioned when domestic inequalities are still
prevalent. With an unemployment rate of 35 to 45 percent and the challenges of
the AIDS pandemic, this question is especially contentious (Schraeder, 2001:
240).
Putting human rights issues at the centre of South African foreign policy has also
created tension with the more apolitical demands associated with the pursuit of
economic self-interest in the international arena (Schraeder, 2001: 240; Black,
2001: 76). The prospect of South African arms sales to Syria and Indonesia for
instance aroused controversy both domestically and internationally (Spence,
2001: 4; Hamill, 2001: 33). The initial success of the arms industry to recruit
Mandela to its cause at a very early stage of his presidency, has also been a
source of concern. The neglect of the then President Mandela to foresee that his
insistence that there was 'nothing wrong' in arms sales that are 'for the purpose
of defending the sovereignty and the integrity of a country', could. have a
detrimental effect upon wider regional development, has also raised
apprehension (Hamill, 2001: 34).
These broader deficiencies of vision, planning and management on the part of
the foreign policy department have been much criticised. Critics have repeatedly
highlighted the lack of coherence and consistency of South African foreign policy.
No framework was provided to guide the management of human rights and
democracy issues in a bilateral context, and these principles were not matched
by careful strategic thinking about how to give them effect (Johnston, 2001: 13-
24). This negligence to provide a strategic framework for dealing with human
rights issues, has been exacerbated by the questions about universality of
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human rights. Human rights can be seen as a universal ideology, since human
rights goals are usually elevated above the rank of competing social goals and
are usually endowed with an aura of timelessness and universal validity. This
characteristic, however, brings forth a number of difficulties, as explained by
Johnston (2001: 18-19). Given that human rights tend to be expressed in
language which is abstract and absolute, they are dealt with as 'more or less'
issues, rather than 'either or issues' (Johnston, 2001: 19). Even in pluralist
democratic political systems, where human rights find the most support, human
rights issues are part of politics and not above them. The 'inconsistencies' in
South Africa's 'holistic' foreign policy, particularly its links with authoritarian
regimes that have poor human rights records, are in part attributed to this
abstract character of human rights principles (Johnston, 2001: 19). The ANC
government's relations with rogue states such as Cuba, Iran and Iraq, received
strong criticism from Western governments. Although this claim of friendship was
an expression of President Mandela's personal commitment to the honouring of
old debts, which was based on the support given to the ANC in the years of exile,
it received much criticism (Spence, 2001: 4; Shcraeder, 2001: 234).
The tensions inherent in advocating human rights principles in Africa were
highlighted by the Nigerian incident in 1995 (van Aardt, 1996: 107). When the
then Nigerian ruler Sani Abacha executed nine environmentalists, including Ken
Saro-Wiwa, Mandela's unilateral call for a boycott of Nigeria's oil and its
expulsion from the Commonwealth, gave rise to a huge outcry from its fellow
African states (van der Westhuizen, 1999b: 447). Controversy also arose when
South Africa was the only government in the developing world to recall its High
Commissioner in protest over the executions in Nigeria (Black, 2001: 78). This
incident raised criticism from its fellow African states which accused South Africa
of acting as a proxy for Western interests and priorities. South Africa was
charged with the accusation that it is breaking norms of 'African solidarity' in
turning in one of its own (Black, 2001: 83), and the then Nigerian president
Abacha posed the question whether South Africa is a leading country of Africa
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and the developing world, or whether it is a 'White country with a Black
president'. This strong foreign policy stance taken by the South African
government towards human rights violations, differed considerably between its
reaction towards Nigeria in 1995 and towards its current approach of 'quiet
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe.
In the context of these contradictions and tensions, South Africa's foreign policy
elite gravitated to multilateralism as the best means of giving effect to its
advocacy of human rights (Black, 2001: 76). Multilateralism offers South Africa a
means of enhancing its leverage and multiplying its influence, whilst
simultaneously minimising its exposure to risk on sensitive foreign policy issues.
After the Nigerian crisis, South Africa has demonstrated a commitment to act
more in concert with international organisation such as the United Nations (UN),
the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth and others. South Africa has seemed
to realise that it is necessary to distance itself from American and European
pressures and to rather take its cue from multilateral deliberation (van der
Westhuizen, 1998b: 450). After the Great Lakes crisis, moreover, Mandela
indicated that he would only act in concert with African leaders, the AU and the
UN. South Africa's turn to multilateral mechanisms as the main vehicle for South
Africa's principled commitment to human rights and democracy, however, has
been accompanied by a decline in the priority placed on these principles (Black,
2001: 88).
South Africa's leadership profile in multilateral institutions mandated with issues
of human rights, democracy and good governance was recognised in 1998 with
the election of South Africa to chair the 54th session of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission (UNCHR) (Vickers, 2003: 173). South Africa's decision at the
UNCHR to place emphasis on thematic human rights issues, rather than co-
sponsoring any country resolutions, has been an indicator of South Africa's risk-
averse approach and its loss of ardour on human rights issues. The danger of
this, as noted by Black (2001: 81), is that the fulfilment of formal treaty
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obligations has come to be viewed as largely sufficient in itself to meet South
Africa's human rights commitments. In this way, the need to engage with more
difficult and controversial cases in specific national contexts, has been reduced
(Black, 2001: 81). Although South Africa's contribution to UN human rights
institutions will yield marginal and incremental gains in terms of advancing the
cause of human rights and will over time provide normative support for specific
transformative challenges, it will not in any direct way challenge the existing
global order (Black, 2001: 82).
2.2.2. Mu/ti/atera/ism
As mentioned above, Pretoria's unilateral position towards the Abacha regime in
Nigeria has been considered a watershed-experience in South Africa's turn to
multilateralism as the best means of giving effect to its advocacy of human rights
(van der Westhuizen et al., 1998: 113). When it became apparent that neither the
governments of developed countries nor those of neighbouring states in SADC
(Southern African Development Community) were prepared to follow South
Africa's lead, the risks of unilateral actions were recognised. These instances
thus lead to the gradual retreat to a more cautious, 'middle of the road' position
both within the Commonwealth and beyond (Black, 2001: 78).
The political risks and elusive rewards of high level unilateral leadership attempts
were also highlighted with Mandela's use of his close personal relationship with
then-Indonesian President Suharto to facilitate a process of dialogue between
Suharto and the jailed East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao (Black, 2001: 79).
Mandela's involvement in the East Timor conflict, and his efforts to broker a
peace accord between Zaire's 10 declining dictator Sese Sese Mobutu and his
rebel challenger, Laurent Kabila, also ended in diplomatic failure and was a
personal affront to Mandela (Black, 2001: 79; van der Westhuizen et al., 1998:
114).
10 The Democratic Republic of the Congo was previously known as Zaire.
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A number of cautionary lessons were taken from these formative experiences
and 'heroic' attempts. The Department of Foreign Affairs realised that the new
South Africa could not rely on heroic executive leadership if it wished to
maximise its effectiveness (Black, 2001: 79). The placement of human rights and
mediated conflict resolution as 'pillars' of South African foreign policy became too
much of a burden in an 'unforgiving globalised economy' (van der Westhuizen et
al., 1998: 114). Careful advance and preparation was recommended and it was
deemed necessary to concert South Africa's human rights efforts on a much
broader basis. Hence multilateralism emerged as a 'safer' diplomatic option in
dealing with thorny issues. The view was held that South Africa's human rights
commitments would be best articulated in multilateral institutions (van der
Westhuizen et al., 1998: 114). Since the promotion of human rights was largely
associated with Western interests, multilateral ism was chosen as the preferred
means to promote human rights in Africa.
The above-mentioned high profile issues and controversies that were
experienced during its first years in office, pushed the ANC government towards
adopting multilateralism to sustain its human rights 'pillar'. Since then,
multilateralism has become a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy (Black,
2001: 77). Multilateral diplomacy entails the involvement of official state actors in
the practices and institutions that facilitate co-operation between three or more
states (Nel et al., 2001: 9). Because of the size and capacity of states,
multilateral institutions provide a legitimate entrée for smaller states such as
South Africa into the affairs of the international community. This diplomacy has
been guided by a belief that bilateral dealings are less effective means of
resolving international institutions due to the high degree of interdependence in
today's' world. Bilateral agreements also do not promote global norms as
effectively as those arrived at through multilateral negotiations (Nossal & Stubbs,
1997: 151). Multilateralism has thus offered South Africa a means of enhancing
its leverage and maximising its influence, while minimising its exposure and risk
on sensitive foreign policy issues. Although it should be realised that whilst
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multilateralism could provide a rationale for caution and/or inaction in cases of
human rights urgency, it can also serve as an effective instrument to advance
human rights and democracy internationally (Black, 2001: 77).
South Africa's attempts to position itself as a middle power in the world have
been closely associated with this turn to multilateralism. Since 1994, South Africa
has emerged as a middle power and its foreign policy has reflected the dynamics
of a new middle power!' emerging in the developing world (van der Westhuizen,
1998a: 435). Change at the world order level, South Africa's position within the
international political economy and diverse social forces that operate in its state-
societal complex have all contributed to propelling South Africa into middle power
behaviour (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 436). Both the position of South Africa in
a hierarchy of power and influence in world affairs, and the specific nature of its
foreign policy have affirmed South Africa's middle power position (Nel et aI.,
2000: 45).
South Africa's use of middle power diplomacy signified 'a certain content of
foreign policy based on an attachment to multilateral institutions and a
collaborative world order'. Although South Africa realised that it cannot act alone
effectively, 'rniddlepowership' has enabled it to have a systemic impact in a small
group or through an international institution (Nel, 2000: 45). Although middle
powers in the developing world are usually dominant in their region, this status of
'rniddlepowership' is only acquired if it includes involvement and leadership in
independent and multilateral initiatives beyond the regional domain. South
Africa's acceptance of various multilateral leadership responsibilities, and its
engagement in a variety of international issues far beyond Southern Africa
illustrates such a position (Nel et aI., 2001: 5). The peace process in Israel and
Palestine, the conflict in Northern Ireland, the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes
District, the East Timor question and the conflict in Sudan are all examples of
South Africa's international engagement (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 437).
11 See Maxi Schoeman (2000) for a critical analysis of South Africa's status as emerging power.
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South Africa's position as middle power has enabled it to playa truly leading role
in the international campaign to ban landmines. Although it is debated whether
this ban truly gave rise to fundamental global change, it is argued that South
Africa's leading international role in this campaign has been viewed as its most
significant attempt to contribute to such change 12 (van der Westhuizen et al.,
1998: 119). The ban on landmines started as an essentially transnational civil-
society driven campaign and South Africa only endorsed this ban when its
conception of its own interests started to coincide with the proposed changes. It
is thus evident that 'behaviour aimed at global transformation is reconcilable with
self-interests as long as state actors are prepared to engage civil society in a
joint process of socially constructed norms and interests'. This case has borne
testimony to the joint potential of small states and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to effect significant normative change in the issues which
the dominant powers have sought to sweep from the international agenda. The
international campaign to ban landmines has illustrated to what extent
transnational mobilisation can be enhanced either by highlighting the
transgression of an embedded norm or by 'grafting' a prior norm onto the matter
in contention (van der Westhuizen et al., 1998: 119).
Nel et al. (2000: 48) maintain that South Africa's wider multilateral role has been
both a function of 'a deep-rooted internationalist commitment among the ANC
ruling party', as well as a 'reflection of responsibilities being foisted on South
Africa by high peers'. These expectations of South Africa's actual capabilities
have however been inflated and in effect allowed South Africa to 'punch above its
weight'. South Africa's position as middle power, on the other hand, has enabled
it to enhance its mediation role, which has been identified as one of South
Africa's foreign policy assumptions. This will be discussed in the following
section.
12 Van der Westhuizen et al. (1999: 118-119) have argued that South Africa is anything but a
rebel within the system of global governance and that its domestic and foreign policies became
status-quo oriented.
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2.2.3. South Africa as mediator
The activity of peacemaking is closely associated with middle power behaviour.
Due to South Africa's position in the global economy, it has been called upon to
perform activities closely associated with middle power behaviour. Expectations
of South Africa to assume a peace-brokering role have been particularly notable
(Nel et al., 2000: 47). In its peace brokering role, especially in cases involving the
infringement of human rights, South Africa has attempted to use its international
reputation in order to secure a peaceful outcome (van der Westhuizen, 1998b:
448). South Africa's foreign policy actions have not been motivated by economic
interest alone, but it has tried to use its international reputation in order to secure
a peaceful outcome (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 448).
In the early post-apartheid years, South Africa's peace brokering initiatives were
driven by the charisma of the Mandela persona as well as by its positive
reputation after its relatively peaceful democratic transition in 1994 (van der
Westhuizen, 1998b: 448; Vale & Taylor, 1999: 630). Since reputation as an
instrument is a declining asset, Mbeki had to deploy different diplomatic and
political skills (Spence, 2001: 7). South Africa has acknowledged the need to
seek a more formal role and the Policy on South African Participation in
International Peace Missions has been adopted. This policy emphasises the
need to address the root causes of conflict, its commitment to seeking long-term
solutions to crises, and the importance of development, human security and
governance issues. Peacebuilding, as a preventative measure, involves long-
term processes that address the root causes of conflict. It also involves
measures to prevent conflict before it erupts (Williams, 1999: 169).
Due to the increasing reluctance of the international community to get involved in
African conflicts, African states have been compelled to accept responsibility for
peace and security themselves (Cilliers, 1999: 3). While the international
community dominated peace brokering in Africa in the past, Africans have begun
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to petition vigorously for higher levels of participation and responsibility for an
indigenous presence in international peacekeeping. 'African solutions for African
problems' has therefore gained much ground in Africa (Taylor & Williams, 2001:
282). There has been a growing acceptance that viable solutions to African
problems require African input and even control (Maclean, 1999: 953).
South Africa's mediation efforts have been increased by its middle power
position. Its ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major
conflicts has enhanced this position. Despite the fact that middle powers have
historically tended to be in the middle rank of material capabilities (van der
Westhuizen, 1998b: 438), it also stood in the middle of conflict situations. Middle
powers, therefore, seek to expand the area of common ground between
disputing states. This, together with a degree of autonomy in relation to major
powers in the system, are critical elements for fulfilling the middle power role
(Nel, et al., 2000: 46). Cox (Schoeman, 2000) also highlights middle powers'
commitment to orderliness and security in the interstate relations, as well as to
the facilitation of orderly change in the world system.
As middle power, South Africa has been involved in a wide range of diplomatic
matters. Because of its regional preponderance, most of South Africa's
diplomatic activities have been concentrated within its immediate region. South
Africa intervened in Lesotho in 1994 during the constitutional crisis; it made
efforts to ameliorate tensions in Angola; it followed a 'quiet diplomacy' approach
towards Zambia to convince Frederick Chiluba to allow his rivals to participate in
the 1996 elections; and it mediated attempts between Mobutu Sese Seko and
Laurent Kabila in the then Zaire (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 437). South
Africa's efforts to mediate peace have also at times extended well beyond its
regional boundaries, such as its efforts to mediate peace in Israel and Palestine,
in Northern Ireland, and in Iraq (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 437). South Africa's
middle-power diplomacy has tended to adopt an activist style and often sought to
insert itself into issues of international concern. Conflict reduction has usually
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been focused on as a primary end of statecraft and an important element in the
diplomatic activities of the state. Such diplomacy has usually included the
development of confidence-building measures between adversaries so that
conflicts of interest do not develop into 'hot' conflicts (Nossal & Stubbs, 1997:
149-152).
South Africa's foreign policy attempts to assume a mediation-role have however
brought some issues to the fore. The question has arisen, whether South Africa
possesses the necessary capacity and expertise to fulfil such a role. This role,
moreover, has been contradicted by acts such as South Africa's arm sales to
other states (Hamill, 2001: 36). The question whether South Africa is prepared to
commit many of the bureaucratic resources that are required to strengthen
regional capacity and make crisis prevention viable, has also been raised
(Hamill, 2001: 37). Whilst an important constituency in the ANC has desired to
maintain a moral high ground in South Africa's foreign policy decisions, others
have been driven by domestic imperatives to pursue material advantage and to
avoid any unconditional, open-ended commitments to the region (Hamill, 2001:
48). There also exists the danger that aspirations to assume a peace broker
position might be abandoned due to an overloaded domestic agenda and
increasing pressures imposing on the ANC government (Hamill, 2001: 49).
South Africa's cautionary approach in regional attempts to pursue peace
brokering initiatives has also been much criticised. Whilst South Africa has
pursued more venturesome peace brokering initiatives in for example Iraq and
the ORC, it has followed a much more cautionary approach in Zimbabwe. Whilst
some fear South Africa's expansion into Africa, others expect South Africa, as
the most powerful African actor, to playa leading role in development issues and
in leading African diplomacy (Mills, 2000: 303). Since South Africa largely relies
on multilateral means to assume a peace brokering role, fulfilling such a role in
the region is dependent on regional cooperation. Such cooperation, however, will
only be possible if South Africa is able assuage regional fears of its hegemonic
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position, and if it can enhance regional integration. South Africa's regional
dominance however questions South Africa's ability to shape the region's destiny
without domination (Hamill, 2001: 48). The crisis in the ORC has also revealed
divisions among SAOC members which further hamper regional cooperation
(Maclean, 1999: 952).
2.2.4. Welding South Africa into the global economy
The Mandela administration has committed itself to weld South Africa's economy
into a global marketplace. Mandela declared at the so" National Conference of
the ANC in 1997 that 'the process of globalisation is an inherent mode of
existence of capital. It is therefore neither the invention of some reactionary cabal
that sits somewhere in the world nor can it be stopped' (van der Westhuizen et
al., 1998: 115). Mandela and the ANC asserted that South Africa's economic
development depended on growing regional and international economic
cooperation in an interdependent world.
According to Vickers (2003: 80), the primary motivation for the ANC's economic
policies were to place South Africa on the path of rapid economic development
with a view to addressing the following four key problem areas in the economy,
namely slow growth, severe poverty, extreme inequality, and the racial basis of
inequality. The ANC maintained, moreover, that 'trade and foreign investment
issues should be a cornerstone of our foreign policy' and that its 'trade policy will
be aimed at raising the level of productivity and at improving the international
competitiveness as a whole'. This highlighted the ANC's efforts to forge solid
relations with the most advanced industrialised states in order to enhance trade
and attract foreign direct investment (Vickers, 2003: 80). The ANC has come to
realise, moreover, that foreign direct investment can only be attracted if an
enabling environment comprised of good governance and economic performance
in line with the 'Washington consensus' is created (Spence, 2001: 5).
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This tension between balancing of its commitments to domestic transformation
with the pressures of an increasingly globalised economy (Williams, 2000: 73;
Vale & Taylor, 1999: 630-632), has been illustrated by its increasingly neo-liberal
macro-economic stance. The ANC's Reconstruction and Development
Programme (ROP) adopted in 1994 signified a commitment to meeting the
populace's basic needs by providing housing, jobs, education, health and welfare
(Ryklief, 2002: 109). This programme was largely driven from below by the trade
unions and civic organisations. Macro-economic policy, however, became more
compromised in the direction of free market premises as the years passed and
culminated in the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution: a macro-economic
strategy (GEAR) of June 1996 (Saul, 2002: 37). This strategy has created
resentment among black labour and unemployed workers who maintained that
GEAR has made concessions to wealthy businessmen while reneging on its
redistributive obligations. GEAR, with its neo-liberal strategies, has also received
staunch criticism from Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that
maintained that the economy has not grown sufficiently to meet domestic
demand for social reform (Maclean, 2003a). Consequently, despite the ANC's
belief that isolation from the global economy spells disaster, its foreign policy
decisions have remained constrained by South Africa's domestic situation 13.
As mentioned before, South Africa's foreign policy orientation in the post-
apartheid period has been described as vacillating between 'realist' and 'moral'
internationalism. In the early post-apartheid years, tension arose between
prioritising its commercial and trade interests, and its role as moral crusader in
the promotion of human rights and democracy (le Pere et al., 1999; Ryall, 1997:
398-399). Vale and Taylor (1999: 630-631) have argued that a large part of the
incongruence in South Africa's foreign policy can be ascribed to the inability of
decision-makers to reconcile South Africa's economic interests with that of the
13 South Africa's income inequality is among the highest in the world and jobless growth has been
experienced, as result of trade liberalisation and global competition (Ie Pere, Lambrechts & van
Nieuwkerk, 1999).
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broader interests of the region. Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (2001: 55-80)
argue that South Africa has misused its economic hegemonic position in the
region by generating economic profit for itself, rather than for the region as a
whole. This is underscored by Ie Pere's et al. (1999) assertion that South Africa's
free trade agreement with the European Union could lead to severe hardship in
the other member countries of Southern African Customs Union (SACU)14.
2.2.5. Regional cooperation
Regional cooperation has been identified as one of the ANC's main foreign policy
assumptions and the Mandela administration recognised that South Africa's
destiny is intertwined with that of the region. Because of South Africa's contact
and overall stake in regional stability, moreover, it was asserted that any foreign
policy attempt to insulate South Africa from developments in the regional political
economy, would lack credibility. Consequently, South Africa has made various
efforts to demonstrate that its destiny is inextricably linked with what happens in
the continent and all the ANC's statements on regional policy have emphasised
interdependence and peaceful co-operation (Hamill, 2001: 29-30; Williams, 2000:
85).
In order to understand the regional dynamics in Southern Africa it is crucial to
understand the enormous asymmetry between South Africa and the other states
in the region. During the 1990's, especially since the ANC-controlled Government
of National Unity (GNU) took office in 1994, relations between South Africa and
its neighbours have improved considerably. Mandela realised that multilateral
consultation, accommodation and collaboration were necessary for peaceful
cooperation and mutual benefit in order to secure the region's future. The
14 Because of this agreement, other SACU member countries will lose a significant share of
government revenue as the SACU revenue pools shrink once tariffs on EU imports into the
customs union fall away; and industries in these countries might need to close down as they face
increased competition from cheap EU products on the South African or their own market (Ie Pere
etal.,1999).
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difficulty, however, has been to ensure mutual benefit through enhanced
interaction without suffering the strong polarisation of investment and migration
that undermined earlier efforts at formal regional co-operation elsewhere in Africa
(Simon, 1998: 5).
South Africa is Africa's most industrialised economy and occupies a structural
position of advantage within Africa as a whole (Schraeder, 2001: 230). Although
South Africa accounts for a mere 5 percent of Africa's population, it produces the
largest percentage of total African Gross Domestic Product (GOP). Ahwireng-
Obeng and McGowan (2001: 63) maintains that South Africa produces around 44
percent of total African GOP. As the second largest and the most populous
country in Southern Africa - its population size is nearly one-third of the region's
total population - its economy dwarfs the rest of the region. South Africa's
economy is 3.4 times larger than the other eleven countries in SAOC combined
(Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 2001: 63). South Africa is also widely considered
as the unrivalled and military powerhouse of the Southern African region (Mills &
Baynham, 1994: 10).
South African businesses, moreover, have aggressively expanded into Africa
because of increasingly attractive African markets. The growth of South African
businesses such as MTN, Vodacom, Pep and Shoprite in Africa has been an
indication of this expansion. (Schraeder, 2001: 233; van Niekerk, 2003: S3). This
expansion has been advanced by the decline in foreign investment in Southern
Africa over the last two decades, which opened the field for South African firms;
as well as the establishment of economic liberalisation and the creation of
investor-friendly economic environments as brought about by the adoption of
Bretton Woods Institutions Structural Adjustment Programmes (Ahwireng-Obeng
& McGowan, 2001: 75). Even before the ending of apartheid, South African
businesses were expanding rapidly into the rest of Africa. By 1995, 22 South
African trade missions in African countries had been established. During 1994
and 1995, South African trade with Africa increased by 53,6 percent and exports
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to Africa are now the largest destination for South Africa's value-added goods
(van der Westhuizen et al., 1998: 116). Despite the view of 'Afro-pessimists', it is
evident that the significance of African markets for South African business has
been increasing. This growing importance of African markets is illustrated by the
fact that although the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Germany
and Japan still are South Africa's major trading nations; seven Southern African
nations rank among South Africa's top twenty export markets. Five African
nations, moreover, are among South Africa's top ten markets. If unclassified
goods are excluded, Africa formed the largest regional export market for South
Africa in 1994, ahead of the European Union (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan,
2001: 56-57).
Despite the ANC's resolve to ensure mutual benefit through regional cooperation,
South Africa has gained the largest benefit out of this enhanced regional
cooperation. Whilst South Africa exported R23, 9 billion worth of goods to its top
seven African trade partners in 1994/1995, South Africa only imported goods
worth R4,4 billion from these seven neighbours. A favourable trade surplus is
thus generated by South Africa of R19, 5 billion, which is in line with GEAR's
emphasis on the importance of exports (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 2001: 56-
57), but against the ANC's promotion of wider regional benefit. Despite
Mandela's assurances that South Africa will 'resist any pressure or temptation to
pursue its own interests at the expense of the sub-continent', Hamill (2001: 47)
argues that the government's objectives may ultimately be eclipsed by an
economic realism driven by domestic priorities. Mills (2000: 318), therefore,
argues that if the ANC's continental policy only focuses on export promotion and
South Africa's growing business links with Africa, regional cooperation will be
hampered over the long term. South Africa will be perceived as an economic
bully that will impede regional cooperation (Mills, 2000: 319).
Despite the 'Madiba' magic that grabbed the admiration of the domestic and
international arena, certain foreign policy contradictions were growing within the
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ANC government. The Mandela presidency's decline in moral aspirationalism
has become apparent as it became subject to the duties and prerogatives of a
government. Whilst some were concerned with the apparent loss of ardour in
South Africa's commitments to human rights, others - notably African states -
were concerned with South Africa's increasing belief in the unavoidability of
placing its economy within the global economy. This trend, and the
accompanying accusations that South Africa is merely acting according to
Western interests and priorities, grew during the Mbeki administration.
2.3. The Mbeki years: 1999-2003
The ambiguity and uncertainty of South African foreign policy, that was a
distinctive feature of the Mandela administration, was replaced by a stronger
vision and purpose after Mbeki became President in 1999 (Ie Pere & van
Nieuwkerk, 1999: 253). Discrepancies between rhetoric and reality, however,
became more and more evident as the years passed. The wavering of the ANC's
commitment to human rights, as the ANC became subject to the duties and
prerogatives of a government, is illustrative of these discrepancies between
rhetoric and reality (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 445). Both domestically and
internationally, however, South Africa has been under pressure to give an
account of the principles that guide and direct its foreign policies in ethical terms.
The government policy-makers have thus been faced with a difficult task in trying
to construct a coherent set of principles, which is defensible in terms of
democracy and human rights, without neglecting national interest (Johnston,
2001: 14).
Following the second post-apartheid election in 1999, Mbeki secured political
control in the hands of the ANC, himself and a small circle of colleagues at the
centre of policy. In this way uncertainty was reduced and the promotion of wealth
and security became the driving forces behind official foreign policy (Ie Pere et
al., 1999). Jacki Selebi, as new Director-General and seasoned diplomat, led the
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foreign policy initiative that reformulated the Department of Foreign Affairs
mission statement in 1999. Wealth creation and security have been distilled by
the Department of Foreign Affairs as the ANC's two primary objectives (Williams,
2000: 73). Wealth creation was to be achieved through a co-ordinated approach
to globalisation, the enhancement of South Africa's international image and the
vigorous pursuit of trade and investment. Security was to be achieved through
the promotion of compliance with international law and active engagement in
conflict prevention, management and resolution (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999:
254). Arising out of these two aims a third aim, namely that of promoting
democratisation and a culture of human rights, has developed. According to Mills
(2000: 300) these aims have reflected Mbeki's concept of a South African foreign
policy built on two legs, where each is standing in the developing and developed
worlds. In this way, the government has attempted to link foreign policy goals
with domestic needs and values. The focus placed on the importance of the
foreign policy principles of wealth and security creation, however, reflected the
diminution in the priority placed on human rights and democracy. In this 'new'
conceptualisation, human rights, democracy and good governance have been
mainly deemed necessary in order to fulfil the first-order priorities - and it was
therefore viewed as second-order priorities (Black, 2001: 88).
Whilst Mandela emphasised the importance of welding South Africa into the
global economy, the Mbeki administration strengthened this impetus. The ANC
government's approach to wealth creation, as developed by Selebi, has been
exemplified by South Africa's macro-economic policy the Growth, Employment
and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). This macro economic policy, has formed
part of South Africa's attempt to compete effectively in an increasingly global
marketplace. Instead of considering a delinking from the global economy a viable
option, the government has focused on what terms South Africa should engage
in the global economy (Williams, 2000: 77). Whilst recognising the importance of
domestic construction and development as the singular priority of the South
African population, the Mbeki administration thus underscored the critical role of
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foreign trade and investment in this process (Schraeder, 2001: 233). GEAR was
adopted with the realisation that South Africa's foreign policy must demonstrate a
commitment to an economic strategy that conformed to external expectations
(van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 442).
The emergence of GEAR, together with the promotion of wealth and security,
provided a clearer definition of South Africa's foreign policy priorities than during
the Mandela administration (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 255). President
Mbeki has acknowledged that an improvement of South Africa's economic
situation requires a continuation of the stringent measures explicit in GEAR's
strategy. It was recognised, however, that these measures would involve pain in
the short term if long-term benefits are to materialise (van der Westhuizen,
1998b: 442). The desirability and effectiveness of GEAR, moreover, has been a
much-debated issue within South Africa. Criticism has been provoked within the
wider black constituency and growing dissatisfaction has taken place within
COSATU, one of the ANC's most important political constituencies (van der
Westhuizen, 1998b: 442). It is argued that since inequality and poverty in South
Africa are not diminishing, GEAR is actually contributing to the insecurity of
South Africa's poor. Seen this way, South Africa's foreign policy is thus
contradictory in the sense that whilst the government claims to promote the
wealth and security of all their citizens, the primary strategy for generating wealth
(GEAR) is contributing to this insecurity. Arguments are thus made for the need
to focus on the means for providing security through constructive transformation,
rather than trying to maintain a status quo which contributes to the insecurity of
South Africa's poor (Williams, 2000: 82).
South Africa's introduction of Black Economic Empowerment has partly been
established to offset this criticism that South Africa is merely playing into the
hands of global capitalists. The South African government has acknowledged
that economic performance and the delivery of social goods to the black majority
remain essential if the legacy of apartheid is to be reversed. South Africa's
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initiation of Black Economic Empowerment may therefore be seen as an attempt
to balance the domestic and foreign policy imperatives. The balancing of these
two opposing imperatives has been essential since there exists an inextricable
link between domestic and foreign policy, and it is widely accepted that 'foreign
policy begins at home' (Spence, 2001: 6).
During both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, it became apparent that
foreign policy has required the prioritisation of goals and the creation of an
orderly and systematic manner of achieving them. It has been necessary to
create a hierarchy of goals in which the most important is consistently pursued
(Schraeder, 2001: 240). Consequently, the question has arisen as to how the
idealism of a moral foreign policy can be balanced with the existence of more
narrowly defined economic national interests (Mills, 2000: 300-304).
The imperative to promote human rights, moreover, has become more and more
contradictory with Mbeki's increased efforts to assume a leadership role in the
African continent. Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance and the advocacy of
a commitment to African solidarity, seemed to clash with South. Africa's
commitment to human rights advocacy. Trying to reconcile the norms of Africa
with that of the developed world soon proved to be a daunting task. The foreign
policy of promoting human rights seemed to be incompatible with the norm of
African solidarity, since it required states to 'speak out against each other'. Since
South Africa's human rights/democracy pillar, moreover, could reinforce the
impression that South Africa was an agent of Western interests and priorities in
the South (the West was considered the most enthusiastic about intrusive human
rights conditionalities), the Mbeki presidency has taken increasing care to avoid
being perceived as a Western proxy. The South African government, therefore,
increasingly emphasised African solidarity (Black, 2001: 79).
43
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.3. 1. The African Renaissance
South Africa's foreign policy has recognised the African continent and the
Southern African region in particular as a critical focus of interest and influence
(Spence, 2001: 8). This recognition has been accompanied by the return of an
element of global 'heroism' in South African foreign policy in 1999. Mbeki's
speech to the Twelfth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1998 signified a
willingness on the part of Mbeki to take on the 'heroic mantle of a global
campaigner for the developing world'. Multilateral diplomacy was now focused on
in a concerted drive to end the economic marginalisation of Africa, and to change
the rules of the global economic game in order to end the perceived
discrimination against developing countries (van der Westhuizen et al., 1998a:
115).
President Mbeki is credited with initiating the call for an African Renaissance
even though the idea of the revival or renewal of Africa is not new. The current
articulation of an African Renaissance borrows from several earlier calls for
African revival from African leaders such as Nkwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere
and Kenneth Kuanda (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 286; Barrell, 2000: 8). Whilst
Nelson Mandela first invoked the vision of an African Renaissance in 1994 at an
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit, it was later popularised by Mbeki
(Cornwell, 1998: 9) and the vision of an African Renaissance has figured
prominently in the speeches of Mbeki and other members of the ANC since mid-
1996 (Matthews, 2002: 100). The African Renaissance appeals to the rebirth and
revival of Africa and has been an attempt to invoke renewed international interest
in Africa and its economic, social and political potential (Kiguwa, 1999: 66-67;
Mayer, 1998: 27). Rather than relying on African standards and excuses, the
Renaissance promotes an increasing competitiveness of African economies in
the global marketplace (Mills, 2000: 318). The word 'Renaissance' is not an
original African concept but is borrowed from the French word meaning 'rebirth'.
Describing a period in Europe, Renaissance refers to the period of renewal and
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re-awakening that followed the Dark Ages and involved social, political and
economic transformation. Despite existing controversy surrounding the word
'Renaissance", Matthews (2002: 102) suggests that the use of the term
'Renaissance' is seen as appropriate for an African vision of transformation,
since the European Renaissance is held to be an example of the transformation
of a society, based on the rediscovery of past achievements. Similar to Europe in
the fourteenth century, contemporary Africa is emerging from an era of social and
intellectual decay and neglect and is experiencing great upheaval and
uncertainty. It is hoped that Africa, like Europe, will be able to build upon its
historical legacy to bring about a transformation of Africa.
The African Renaissance has emerged as the defining foreign policy concept of
the Mbeki administration and South Africa's continental policy has coalesced
around the idea of an African Renaissance (Williams, 2000: 85). Mbeki's vision of
an African Renaissance has not claimed to be new, but rather that current
15 Matthews (2002: 103-105) argues that the use of the term 'Renaissance' in the declaration of a
period of renewal and transformation in Africa create a few problems. It is highlighted that since
the first reference to the European Renaissance only occurred three centuries later, the use of
the term was a retrospective characterisation of a historical era. The African wish is thus an a
priori wish rather than an a posteriori assessment. The use of an European word to describe an
African transformation is also questioned. This is especially ironic since the European
Renaissance has had various negative implications for the African continent. The European
Renaissance gave rise to the search for new economic markets that in turn led to the invasion of
Africa by Europeans. Ramose (2000: 47) argues that focusing upon the word 'renaissance' is the
appropriation of a historical concept that does not belong to the history of Africa in the first place.
Matthews (2002: 104) also highlights problems arising as to the content of the African
Renaissance. It is argued that the content focuses on establishing something new in Africa, rather
than on rediscovering something from the past. The African Renaissance, moreover, is more
often than not, linked to improvements in technology, development, modernisation and to other
changes that does not have anything to do with rediscovering the past. A last shortcoming of the
term 'Renaissance' identified by Matthews (2000: 104) relates to the fact that the European
Renaissance was also a period of violence, war and political instability.
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circumstances in Africa are conducive to the realisation of this revival (Matthews,
2002: 101). The strong attachment placed on the concept of the African
Renaissance, is a reflection of the classic African policy concerns that have
become integral to South African foreign policy.
South Africa's interpretation of the African Renaissance has included the new
themes of democracy and human rights promotion that are accepted in varying
degrees throughout Africa. President Mbeki has maintained that South Africa's
primary foreign policy ambition is to secure the conditions necessary for an
African Renaissance by establishing 'genuine and stable democracies' in Africa,
from which systems of governance will flourish (Mills, 2000: 310-312). This
foreign policy has thus emphasised the centrality of the African continent in
South African foreign policy, and outlined the critical role of South Africa as an
intermediary between the African continent and leading foreign powers in the rest
of the world (Schraeder, 2001: 233).
President Mbeki's State of the Nation Address in August 2002 underscored the
fact that South Africa's foreign policy is anchored on the framework of the African
Renaissance. This aspiration has found concrete expression in the New
Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) document. (Pahad,
2002). Nepad was launched in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001. This document
was received by the developed world with considerable enthusiasm as 'an
African-led initiative that would provide the framework for promoting development
in Africa in the new millennium'. Nepad was essentially a partnership between
African leaders, that would promote good governance and human rights, and the
West who would provide increased trade and investment into Africa (Taylor,
2003). This document states that 'African peoples have begun to demonstrate
their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership' and that
'development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human
rights, peace and good governance'. Nepad thus promised that 'a democratic
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Africa will become one of the pillars of world democracy, human rights and
tolerance' (Taylor, 2002).
In promoting Nepad, Mbeki did not only need the support from developed
industrialised nations, but also the support and acquiescence of the present
African leadership. This diplomatic agenda has proved to be a complex
endeavour, since South Africa had to avoid being regarded as a regional bully
and as a proxy to Western interests. Fearful of being isolated as a lone crusader,
Mbeki had to rely mainly on his diplomatic powers of persuasion and multilateral
diplomacy (Olivier, 2003).
An important feature of Nepad has been the establishment of the African Peer
Review Mechanism .(APRM) that has been described as 'an instrument
voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self-
monitoring mechanism'. This mechanism attempts to institutionalise a process
whereby African states themselves will censure or praise states which conform to
the governance criteria of Nepad (van der Westhuizen, 2004: 26). As will be
illustrated in the next chapter, the evolving Zimbabwean crisis has been
perceived as a test case of the APRM. South Africa's reticence to condemn
Mugabe's violation of human rights and democratic standards, created an
impression of inconsistency and ineffectiveness surrounding its mission to
promote human rights in its foreign policy (Black, 2001: 78). The decision to
move peer review about political questions out of Nepad and under the auspices
of the African Union, moreover, raised criticism against South Africa's apparent
loss of ardour in promoting human rights (van der Westhuizen, 2004: 30).
The dilution of South Africa's attempts to promote human rights, has to a certain
extent been replaced by a stronger focus on promoting African solidarity. This
has been accompanied by Mbeki's increasing leadership role in the Southern
African region, and in the continent as a whole. Mbeki's attempts to act as the
voice for the South, in order to build bridges of understanding between the
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Northern developed states and the Southern developing states, have also been
illustrative of these attempts to garner African support and solidarity.
Despite the laudability of Mbeki's Renaissance vision, however, this vision has
largely failed to resonate across the continent and did not bring forth the
anticipated continental embrace (Ie Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 261). There
has remained a lack of clarity and conceptual understanding concerning the
Renaissance in the ANC's foreign policy, and definitions of the African
Renaissance and its operational meaning have been wide-ranging and vague
(Mills, 2000: 310-312). The African Renaissance has been viewed, moreover, as
being 'high on sentiment, low on substance' (Williams, 2000: 86). The romantic
metaphors of 'rebirth, revival and reawakening' had to battle with the crude
realities of Africa's decline, namely war, conflict, HIV/AIDS, poverty, malnutrition,
famine, drought and underdevelopment (Ie Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 261).
As well, Nepad has been criticised for being an 'elitist club' for African leaders as
it neglected to involve civil society in its formation. Mbeki's attempts to promote
African solidarity therefore seem to have been mainly aimed at gaining the
support of other African leaders, rather than civil society.
Mixed feelings have existed, moreover, as to the desirability of. Mbeki's
dominance in the conceptualisation of the African Renaissance. Whilst some
have viewed Mbeki's ability to popularise the concept outside the African
continent (Mbeki seems to enjoy considerable international respectability)
positively, others have criticised his relative popularity with Western leaders and
accused him of acting as a proxy to the interests of Western leaders. This gave
rise to a decline in Mbeki's popularity in the African continent that in turn has
encumbered the acceptance of the African Renaissance by Africans (Vale &
Maseko, 1998: 286).
South Africa's attempts to playa leadership role in the region and in the African
continent were met by suspicions as to South Africa's interests (Schoeman,
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2000). Although some have argued that South Africa is 'well placed' to lead the
Renaissance because of its moral authority and strong economy, others such as
Vale and Maseko (1998: 283-287), have opposed a South African-led
Renaissance. They have argued that South Africa's relative economic and
military strengths are reasons why South Africa should not assume a leadership
position. This has been in line with accusations that South Africa equates South
African interests with African interests. Due to its economic hegemony, South
Africa's economic expansion and its efforts to promote the African Renaissance
in Africa have been perceived as a veiled attempt by South Africa to impose its
hegemony on the continent (le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 261). These
suspicions have been exacerbated by accusations that South Africa's penetration
of African markets has only benefited South Africa, since trade has so far been a
one-way street at the expense of producers and manufacturers from the rest of
Africa. Some argue that 'the onslaught' is now led by 'profit-seeking South
African businesses' that are led by private capital (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan,
2000: 77). Whether these perceptions hold true or not, the fact that Mbeki's
African Renaissance has been perceived by some as a 'Iimitationist' concept that
serves the transnational hegemonic interests and dominant capital of South
Africa (Black, 2001: 86), has been detrimental to South African attempts to
assume a leadership position in Africa.
Howard Barrell's (2000: 8) argument that the focus of Mbeki's African
Renaissance stands in contrast to the essentially political emphasis of earlier
African nationalists has also raised suspicions in Africa about South Africa's
motives. Mbeki's forerunners such as Nkwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and
Kenneth Kuanda focused more on the revival of African culture than on economic
integration with the West. Mbeki's emphasis on welding Africa within the global
economy, therefore, has raised suspicions that Africa is merely acting according
to Western interests. South Africa's initial strong emphasis on its commitments to
human rights, about which the West is most enthusiastic, increased these
suspicions as to South Africa's true identity and interests.
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The principles of human rights and good governance that are promoted by the
African Renaissance have not really caught on in Africa 16. Although these
principles have gathered strength throughout Africa since the end of the Cold
War, they leave some African leaders uneasy due to their inevitable clash with
the sovereignty principle, as well as because of their emphasis on democratic
standards (Schraeder, 2001: 233; Onadipe, 1998). Because of the frequent
accusations against South Africa for acting as a Western proxy in Africa, South
Africa has been compelled to follow a more cautious approach in the region.
Within this context, it is not surprising that the Mbeki administration attempted to
assuage regional fears by diluting its commitment to promoting human rights and
instead emphasised a stronger commitment to African solidarity as a foreign
policy goal. During the Mbeki presidency, it became apparent that South Africa's
foreign policy fell more and more prey to the urge to identify with Africa and other
members of the developing South (Mills, 2000: 298).
16 South Africa's campaign to extend or entrench democracy in Southern Africa has faced various
problems. Only Botswana has a long democratic pedigree. The regular interventions of the
military have made Lesotho a 'barrack democracy'; Swaziland clings to a highly authoritarian
traditional order; Angola seems to be 'permanently suspended between war and peace'; Malawi
experienced three decades of personalised dictatorship; Mozambique has a tentative peace and
Zimbabwe has a de facto one-party state. It is thus evident that South Africa will need to be
sensitive to the differing rates of democratic progress in the region (Hamill, 2001: 39).
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2.4. Conclusion
As time progressed, the ANC government's commitment to human rights
advocacy became more and more diluted. Experiences such as the Nigerian
saga and the increasing pressure of the 'neo-mercantilists' compelled the
Mandela presidency to gravitate towards multilateralism as a vehicle for
promoting its commitment to human rights. This however, gave rise to a loss of
ardour in the ANC government's commitment to human rights. During the Mbeki
presidency, on the other hand, Mbeki's desire to playa leadership role in the
African continent and his emphasis on the African Renaissance gave rise to a
stronger commitment to African solidarity.
Although a gradual decline in a commitment to human rights advocacy has been
characteristic of both the Mandela- and Mbeki administrations, it has been more
noticeable during the Mbeki presidency. This can partly be ascribed to Mandela's
personal international standing, and the moral high ground associated with
'Madiba'. Mbeki, on the other hand, followed a much more pragmatic approach to
foreign policy commitments. Compared to the Mandela administration, moreover,
the Mbeki administration has received staunch criticism for acting as a proxy to
Western interests. Mbeki's 'I am an African' speech (Mathebe, 2001: 115), has
perhaps been the most illustrative of Mbeki's attempts to appeal to the African
audience.
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Chapter Three
South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards
Zimbabwe
3.1. Introduction
The downward spiral of Zimbabwe under President Robert Gabriel Mugabe and
the slide into lawlessness has excited international opinion. Perhaps even more
controversial, has been South African President Thabo Mbeki's obvious reticence
to condemn Mugabe's increasing authoritarianism and breach of human rights
and democratic standards.
The storm that surrounded the Commonwealth's decision over Zimbabwe's
continued suspension in Nigeria in December 2003, and Mbeki's appeals to the
Commonwealth to end Zimbabwe's suspension, have increased international
criticism. Accusations of a loss of ardour in promoting human rights in an effort to
repay old debts to a liberation partner, have been thrown at Mbeki. This chapter
will argue that a deeper understanding of South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, however, cannot be gained by focusing on
material interests alone. In order to gain a more nuanced understanding, it is
necessary to look at the foreign policy norms within the specific historic context of
Africa, and the way they have influenced South Africa's foreign policy context
and identity.
South Africa's decision to follow a foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards
Zimbabwe must be understood within the context of Mbeki's vision of an African
Renaissance. With his dreams of a new Africa, Mbeki has seemed to follow in
the footsteps of the founding fathers of pan-Africanism. Mbeki has exhibited a
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grand vision for Africa and in his African Renaissance idea, he has articulated the
idea of building a new, progressive and modernised Africa. Whilst original pan-
Africanists sought the 'political kingdom' for Africa, Mbeki has cast himself as a
neo-pan-Africanist, seeking the 'economic kingdom' for the ailing continent'
(Olivier, 2003). Mbeki's attempts to place Africa within the global economy,
however, have received criticism from African states as to the desirability of
welding African states into the global economy (Mazur, 2000: 79). Green and
Griffith (2002: 58) maintain that whilst it is recognised that globalisation brings
benefits to some, globalisation does not bring benefits for everybody. It is for
instance argued that globalisation's 'trickle-down' effect has yet to decrease the
income gap between the very rich and the very poor (Cornwell, 2002: 93).
Mbeki's relative popularity with Western leaders has also been a contentious
issue. Whilst some have viewed this popularity positively, others have accused
Mbeki of acting according to Western interests and priorities. These accusations
have led to a decline in the popularity of Mbeki in the African continent that has in
turn encumbered the acceptance of the African Renaissance by Africans (Olivier,
2003).
Seen within the context of trying to promote African solidarity, it is thus not
surprising that the Mbeki administration has diluted its commitment to human
rights. Since a commitment to human rights involves the rejection of the norms of
state sovereignty and 'speaking out against each other' which are established
norms in Africa, South Africa had to follow a cautionary approach with its
advocacy of human rights and democracy in Africa. The rebuff from fellow
African countries after South Africa recalled its high commissioner from Abuja
during the Nigerian crisis, has also compelled South Africa to act with more
caution in its commitment to human rights (van der Westhuizen, 1998b: 448).
Accusations of acting as a proxy to Western interests and priorities in its
commitment to human rights advocacy, as well as South Africa's desire to
promote African solidarity, has played an important role in South Africa's foreign
policy stance towards Zimbabwe. Before this policy of 'quiet diplomacy' is
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discussed, however, a brief overview of Zimbabwe's political and economic
decline will be given.
3.2. Zimbabwe's economic and political decline
Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 after a prolonged liberation war17 led
by ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front) and PF-ZAPU
(Zimbabwe African People's Union) (Kagaro, 2003: 10). After the Lancaster
House Conference and ZANU-PF assumed power in 1980, the transition was
made from white-minority rule to black-majority rule. Although indicators in the
early post-colonial years pointed to substantial economic progress and political
stability, Zimbabwe has been increasingly faced with economic ruin and political
dissent (Dashwood, 2002: 78). A confluence of both colonial and post-
independence experiences has given rise to the unprecedented Zimbabwean
crisis (Kagoro, 2003: 8). It is necessary, however, to recognise that the crisis in
Zimbabwe has not primarily been about land, but rather about economic collapse
and a crisis of political legitimacy, which has led to the abandonment of the rule
of law (Lahiff, 2003: 82). Democratic standards have weakened and economic
development and stability has worsened (de Villiers, 2003: 3). The combination
of land invasions, political violence and the cost of the DRC intervention,
moreover, has given Zimbabwe the status of international pariah outside the
African continent (Dashwood, 2002: 97).
During the 1980s, it became evident that the ZANU-PF regime continuously used
law as an instrument of coercion and repression18. The civic and political space
17 Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation that took place between 1966 and 1980 is also known as the
Second Chimurenga.
18 The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 7 of 1987 introduced an executive
presidency with an unlimited term of office. Mugabe became the first incumbent with 'omnipotent
powers typically given to executive presidents in a one-party state'. With the rationale of
. facilitating the exercise of state power, power was shifted towards the executive that led to the
marginalisation of the legislature and the judiciary (Kagora, 2003:12).
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became more and more restricted during the late 1980s and 1990s 19 (Kagoro,
2003: 12). Repressive colonial legislation such as the Law and Order
Maintenance Act was employed to stifle the emergence or continuance of
opposition voices. After the repression of limited insurgency in Matabeleland,
ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU signed a Unity Accord in December 1987 that ended
ZANU-PF's military occupation of Matabeleland. After the Unity Accord, ZANU-
PF began pushing aggressively for a one-party state as the only vehicle whereby
comprehensive national unity and development could be achieved (Kagoro,
2003: 12). The Unity Accord, therefore, did not only consolidate Mugabe's power
and facilitated the formation of a one-party state, but effectively destroyed the
only viable opposition that remained after the attainment of national
independence in 1980 (Makumbe, 2003: 35). The contours of an authoritarian
state were thus determined early on in the post-independence era (Kagoro,
2003: 11).
Chitiyo (2004: 49) argues that Zimbabwe has been simultaneously confronted by
two inter-related socio-economic challenges, namely the land question and the
issue of war veterans. Two important agreements were reached between the
various political parties and the British government at the Lancaster House
Conference in 1979. The first agreement held that the new constitution would
remain inviolate for at least ten years whilst the second agreement stated that the
property rights of commercial farmers would be protected (Chitiyo, 2004: 61).
After 1980 the new government was anxious to attract foreign investment and
thus underlined its reconciliation theme by declaring white farmers as a valuable
asset to Zimbabwe (Chitiyo, 2004: 62).
19 It is within this context that Edgar Tekere, the then Secretary-General of ZANU-PF, broke ranks
with ZANU-PF. He maintained that 'democracy was in the intensive care unit' in Zimbabwe.
Tekere joined forces with disgruntled sections of the student movement and workers to form the
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989 and became the first person within the ZANU-PF
leadership to publicly oppose the one-party agenda (Kagora, 2003: 13).
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With the attainment of independence in 1980, however, Zimbabwe inherited a
highly dualistic economy", as created by the large-scale 'settler-colonialism'
(Lahiff, 2003: 77; Mayo, 2000: 6). Both the access to resources and the
distribution of resources in Zimbabwe were extremely inequitable by the end of
the liberation wars (Hoogeveen & Kinsey, 2001: 127). This dualistic economy
was most visible in the agricultural sector where the division of land was
extremely inequitable (Kinsey, 1999: 177). While a small group of about 4500
large-scale farmers dominated agriculture, six million people lived in highly
populated and marginal rural lands" (Hoogeveen & Kinsey, 2001: 127). Since
access to land has remained both a political and economic demand for a large
part of the population (Lahiff, 2003: 78), achieving an equitable balance in the
racial and national nature of land ownership has been a key political objective of
Zimbabwe's land reform programme (Mayo, 2000: 23).
After twenty years of independence, however, it became evident that Zimbabwe's
land programme lagged far behind its own implementation schedule (Manji,
2001: 328). The government lacked the financial resources to implement the land
programme without external assistance (Dashwaad, 2002: 88). At the same time
increasing fiscal constraints and growing unemployment pressured the
government to expand land acquisition for redistribution and to resolve this long-
standing issue for once and for all (Kinsey, 1999: 173). The coincidence of the
introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990
with the drought of 1990-1993, resulted in increasing unemployment, inflation
and high prices. This, in turn, aggravated rural problems (Chitiyo, 2004: 63).
20 This economy consisted of a large-scale capital-intensive sector that produces commodities for
national and international markets, and a small-scale, labour-intensive sector that mainly
~roduces food crops for household consumption and local markets (Lahiff, 2003: 77).
1 According to Kingsey (1999: 177), approximately 700 000 smallholders occupied 16,4 million
hectares in generally less-favoured parts of the country at the time of independence. This figure is
equivalent to 49 per cent of all farming land. On the other hand, some 5000 to 6000 large-scale
commercial farmers occupied 46 per cent of the total generally prime land.
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By the mid-1990s, Mugabe was free from the constraints of the Lancaster House
settlement on land reform and he gradually began to show his true colours. The
unleashing of war veterans into Zimbabwe has resulted in a breakdown of the
rule of law22. These acts, moreover, have been perpetrated at the command of
the state or political elite (Kagora, 2003: 9). Violence perpetrated by former
liberation war guerrillas during the parliamentary and presidential elections of
2000 and 2002, has illustrated Mugabe's attempt to secure victory by coercion,
rather than to move forward in a transition to democracy (Makumbe, 2003: 30).
Unbridled corruption has become widespread in Zimbabwe, and high levels of de
jure and de facto impunity for various types of criminals has become the order of
the day. A political culture of fear has been promoted and democratic values
have been negated (Makumbe, 2003: 36).
The land reform rhetoric of the 1996 presidential elections that presented land
reform as an urgent task to be completed, was backed in 1997 by Mugabe's
aggressive vow that the mass expropriation would be concluded before the end
of 1998 (Kinsey, 1999: 174). The occurrence of corruption and malfeasance
scandals during the 1990s also increased pressure to defuse these issues by
diverting attention to the land question (Kinsey, 1999: 178). Kinsey (1998: 174)
maintains that Mugabe's attempted 'land grab' is commonly viewed as a crude
attempt to deflect attention away from growing opposition and mounting
economic problems. ZANU-PF's resort to authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies
has exemplified the failure of the former liberation movement to transform itself
into a democratic political party (Maclean, 2002: 520-522). According to
Makumbe (2003: 33), it is evident that 'the guerrillas have still not taken off their
uniforms; they have not yet laid down their guns'. During both the parliamentary
22 Chitiyo (2004: 50) maintains that there exists an important link between the land crisis and the
situation of the war veterans. Both the peasant class and the war veterans have formed ZANU-
PF's most powerful voting constituencies. After the liberation movement, the grassroots soldiers
and peasants received little compensation, despite the fact that they had borne the brunt of the
suffering during the liberation war. It is thus not surprising that both the peasant farmers and the
veterans felt that the government had failed them and insisted on land and/or financial
compensation as the price for allowing the government to remain in power (Chitiyo, 2004: 50).
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and presidential elections, the former freedom fighters threatened to go back to
the bush and restart the war if the MDC won23 (Makumbe, 2003: 39).
Zimbabwe's claims that it would acquire commercial farms without compensation
turned out to be extremely controversial both nationally and internationally
(Chitiyo, 2004: 63), and a diplomatic rift developed between the Zimbabwean and
British governments (Chitiyo, 2004: 64). Although the British government
maintained that it is not opposed to land redistribution as such (provided that it is
done in a transparent manner with the intention of alleviating rural poverty), it has
been reluctant to finance land reform plans due to the failure of the Zimbabwean
government to explain the modalities of land redistribution and to establish the
necessary infrastructures to make it a sustainable and achievable goal (Chitiyo,
2004: 64).
With Mugabe's realisation of his declining popularity, as exemplified by the defeat
suffered by ZANU-PF in the February 2000 National Referendum, he tried to
impose short-term racial and political solutions on genuine agrarian problems
(Chitiyo, 2004: 50). Over 800 white commercial farms were forcibly occupied by
groups of so-called war veterans. Most of these 'war-veterans' however, were
unemployed youths, some who were not even born at the time of the war of
liberation. Whilst this militancy has provided politically expedient benefits for the
government, the cost to the nation is unsustainable (Chitiyo, 2004: 51; Solomon,
2002: 152).
Bad government decisions and politics have thus produced a declining economy
that has in turn increased the misery and despondency of the Zimbabwean
population (Kagoro, 2003: 9). A chronic shortage of foreign currency, fuel and
other imports exist (Robertson, 2003: 48). Capital flight has occurred, official
23 This is in line with Makumbe's (2003: 39) argument that whenever former liberation movements
are threatened with loss of political power, they tend to resuscitate their original achievements as
liberators as a license to continued tenure of office. Wartime tactics of instilling fear in the
electorate in order to win elections are also harnessed.
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development assistance has been withdrawn and foreign direct investment has
dried up (Makumbe, 2003: 36). It is estimated that real GOP will contract by 13,1
percent in 2003 and 6,1 percent in 2004. Inflation, estimated at 368 percent in
early 2003, will continue to soar (Maclean, 2003). Zimbabwe is currently facing a
serious food shortage (Oashwood, 2002: 100) and half of the Zimbabwean
population faces starvation. Unemployment is estimated to be at 70 percent and
poverty has increased with over 80 percent of the population living below the
poverty line (Tsvangirai, 2003: 135; Makumbe, 2003: 36).
The increasingly desperate agrarian situation already began with the drought of
1990 to 1992 (Chitiyo, 2004: 68). Implementing the Economic Structural
Adjustment Program (ESAP) as recommended by the International Monetary
Fund, did little to improve Zimbabwe's economy. Since the introduction of ESAP
corresponded with the government's abandonment of the social programs it had
introduced upon assuming power, opposition increased against Mugabe
(Maclean, 2002: 514; Moore, 2001: 915). Zimbabwe's economic decline was
exacerbated by the government's war veteran dlsbursements/" (Oashwood,
2002: 88). The huge increase in land invasions in 2000 and politically inspired
murders and the spread of fear and intimidation, compelled the donor community
to punish Zimbabwe. All new donor-funding was frozen in July 2000 which
aggravated the economic crisis (Oashwood, 2002: 93). The government's
disregard for property rights has also prompted foreign banks to withdraw credit
lines and investment into Zimbabwe has been stopped (The Economist, 2002a:
30).
Mugabe's decision to commit Zimbabwean troops to the ORC in June 1998, in
response to Laurent Kabila's request for assistance against Ugandan and
24 The ZANU-PF government's failure to financially compensate grassroots ex-combatants
precipitated a political and financial crisis in the 1990s (Chitiyo, 2004: 66). In 1997, President
Mugabe announced a package for war veterans that would pay each war veteran a lump sum of
Z$50 000 and a gratuity for life of Z$5000 per month. The amount awarded had not been
budgeted for and almost caused the collapse of the country's financial system (Kagoro, 2003:
18).
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Rwandan-backed rebels, has been controversial both domestically and
internationally. This request was made through the regional institutional
framework of SADC and provided an opportunity to Mugabe to assert his
leadership in the region (Dashwood, 2002: 80). Cilliers and Malan (2001: 22)
assert that President Mugabe wanted to gain international prominence by
providing a counterweight to South Africa's dominant role in SADC. This search
for regional prestige and influence, however, has held serious consequences for
Mugabe's domestic and international support. Not only did the international donor
community refuse to commit funds for land reform when Mugabe sent troops to
the DRC (Dashwood, 2002: 88), but this intervention gave rise to a huge
domestic outcry (Maclean, 2002: 523). It has been alleged that the funds
necessary to deploy 11 000 troops in the DRC led to a substantial diversion of
resources that were originally earmarked for poverty alleviation and resolving the
land problem. This intervention in the DRC thus exacerbated Zimbabwe's
economic decline (Chitiyo, 2004: 68).
Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government's increasing unpopularity advanced the
cause of opposition forces. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was
formed in September 1999, only months before the June 2000 general elections
and reflected a coalescing of opposition forces (Maclean, 2002: 514). Morgan
Tsvangirai stepped down as secretary general of the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU), to lead the MDC. This diverse group has been united by a
general concern about the state of the economy, unemployment, and the
government's poor management of the economy (Dashwood, 2002: 94).
The popular rejection of the draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum,
exposed the vulnerability of the ZANU-PF government (Dashwood, 2002: 95).
For the first time since 1980, the people had rejected ZANU-PF's proposals at
the electoral ballot. This victory signalled to Mugabe that his stranglehold on
power was starting to decline (McWilliam, 2003: 96). The widespread support the
. .
MDC was able to attract in such a short time frightened Mugabe and ZANU-PF.
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The emergence of a viable opposition to the ruling party triggered ZANU-PF's
authoritarian inclination (Dashwood, 2002: 95). Consequently, drastic measures
were taken by the ZANU-PF government to maintain control over power and the
government resorted to violence, racism and public intimidation. The land issue,
racism, violence and intimidation were the main instruments used against
political rivals (Makumbe, 2003: 27). Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party, moreover,
have made considerable mileage out of the claim that it prosecuted the liberation
struggle against the British colonial-settler regime (Makumbe, 2003: 29).
Opposition forces have found it extremely difficult to gain support due to the
government's clampdown on all forms of opposition. MDC leaders have
continuously been harassed and tortured (Tsvangirai, 2003: 136). In the run-up
to the 2002 elections, opposition supporters were killed (Solomon, 2002: 151).
Mugabe's growing disregard for the press and the courts has also encumbered
the opposition (McWilliam, 2003: 96). During the run-up to the 2002 election,
emergency legislation was passed that was designed to stifle independent media
coverage and tight restrictions were imposed on local and international election
monitors. The state controlled media behaved as a mouthpiece for ZANU-PF and
denied access to opposition forces (Hamill, 2002).
The third Zimbabwean presidential election was held on 9-11 March 2002
(Raftopoulos, 2002: 413). According to the election outcomes, Robert Mugabe
polled 56,2 percent of the votes cast, whereas Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC
polled 42 percent. The verdict of the presidential election, however, has been
disputed on both a national and international level. The differences in the
perceived acceptance of the election are notable (Barber, 2002: 1145).
The leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, protested that the result was
'illegitimate' and condemned the election as a case of 'highway robbery'.
Tsvangirai claimed that the Zimbabwean authorities had engaged in systematic
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cheating, spoiling tactics, rigid new laws25, sheer obstruction and political
violence and intimidation during the run-up to the election (Barber, 2002: 1145). It
is for these reasons that the MDC held that the election results did not 'reflect the
true will of the people of Zimbabwe and consequently are illegitimate in the eyes
of the people'. As a result, the MDC did not accept the election outcome (Barber,
2002: 1145).
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a network of 38 organisations,
did not judge the election free and fair. The Chairperson of ZESN, Matchaba-
Hove, maintained that the elections violated almost all of the SADC
Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards'" (Barber, 2002: 1147).
The African response to the election was somewhat different. Presidents
Chissano of Mozambique, Muluzi of Malawi and Nujoma of Namibia all indicated
their acceptance of the elections by attending Mugabe's inauguration as
President. President Mkapa of Tanzania and Arap Moi of Kenya also accepted
the legitimacy of the elections. The OAU, which has always been reserved in
criticising its members, held that 'in general the elections were transparent,
credible, free and fair' (Taylor, 2002b: 407). The Nigerian observer mission group
was also supportive, and the SADC Council of Ministers declared the election
'substantially free and fair' and held that the vote was a 'true reflection' of the will
25 A newly amended electoral law determined that only state-appointed monitors may oversee
voting and counting (The Economist, 2002a: 31). Mugabe also attempted to disenfranchise some
voters by passing new laws. One example is the law that prohibited Zimbabweans abroad to vote,
unless they are diplomats or soldiers. Those with foreign-born parents, unless they proved before
January 6 2002 that they had renounced all claims to a foreign passport, lost their Zimbabwean
citizenship (The Economist, 2002a: 31).
26 Voter education was disrupted and there was insufficient time to conduct voter education, and
to train the 22 000 monitors. These monitors, moreover, were all civil servants, in particular from
the army and the police. Disturbing episodes of violence occurred even during the polling days.
According to Matchaba-Hove, 'there is no way these elections could be described as substantially
free and fair'. This view was shared by Zimbabwe's Women's Coalition - an umbrella body of
individual Zimbabwean women and women's non-governmental organisations. They maintained
that the elections were conducted in an unsafe, unfair and unacceptable environment and
consequently rejected the outcome of the election (Barber, 2002: 1144-1147). The Crisis in
Zimbabwe Coalition (a coalition of some 500 hundred church and civic groups) also concluded
that the election had failed to meet most of the basic requirements for being free and fair (Barber,
2002: 1147).
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of the people (Barber, 2002: 1147-1149). SADe's statement declared that
although the report indicated that there were some incidents of violence during
the run-up of the election and that there were some logistical problems during the
actual process of polling, SADe endorsed the positions taken by the SADe
Ministerial Task Force on Zimbabwe that the elections were substantially free
and fair (SA eers: 2002).
The head of the South African Parliamentary Observer Mission (SAPOM),
Samuel Motsuenyane, maintained in its interim report that although the election
was not adequately free and fair and that 'tension and incidents of violence and
intimidation' occurred during the pre-election period, the 'outcome should be
considered legitimate'. All the members of the SAPOM, however, did not agree
with Motsuenyane's interpretation and the document was to be amended in its
final version (Barber, 2002: 1150). Despite reporting some irregularities, such as
the announcement of polling stations in less than 72 hours before polling,
SAPOM concluded that the election 'substantially represents the will of the
Zimbabwean people'. Therefore, it pronounced the 2002 Presidential elections as
a 'credible expression of the will of the people' (South African Government,
2002). South Africa's minority parties, however, came to the conclusion that they
could not endorse the elections as being genuinely free and fair (South African
Government,2002).
The Western response has been much more critical. Britain's Prime Minister Blair
made his position clear before the election. Jack Straw, the British Foreign
Secretary, declared after the election that there was 'pretty strong' evidence that
Mugabe had stolen the election. President Bush took a similar stance and
declared that 'we do not recognise the outcome of the election because we think
it's flawed' (Barber, 2002: 1151-1153). Europe was also unanimous in its
condemnation and France and Germany indicated that the election was neither
free, nor fair (Barber, 2002: 1151-1153; Maclean, 2003a). Amnesty International,
the Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum and the Southern African Legal
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Assistance Network supported this finding. Their findings were that irrespective
of what happened on polling day, the election could not be adjudged free or fair
because of events in the pre-election period (Johnston, 2001).
3.3. South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe
The political crisis surrounding land invasion and leadership succession have
placed the international spotlight on Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2002: 78). Mugabe's
increasing authoritarian tendencies and continuous violations of human rights
and democratic standards, however, have highlighted the perpetual reluctance of
African elites to criticise 'one of their own' (Taylor, 2002a; Maclean, 2003b). As
the Zimbabwean crisis enfolded, South Africa's foreign policy stance towards
Zimbabwe seemed to be cautious and even ambiguous at times.
In reaction to the violent coercion and racial scapegoating which has
characterised Zimbabwe since the February 2000 referendum, South Africa has
designed a foreign policy of 'quiet diplomacy' to encourage Mugabe to change
course (Hamill, 2002). The South African government has maintained that Mbeki
would have a stronger impact on the Zimbabwean situation if he could use an
attitude of sympathy and friendship to nudge Mugabe in the right direction
(Johnson, 2001). Public condemnation of Mugabe, on the other hand, would
alienate the Zimbabwean government and in effect prohibit South Africa from
exerting any influence on ZANU-PF (Dempster, 2003). Aziz Pahad, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, has therefore stated that the international community
has an obligation to create favourable conditions in order to facilitate dialogue
between Zimbabwe's political parties" (Die Burger, 2003a: 4).
Since the February 2000 referendum, the ANC has attempted to facilitate
dialogue between the MDC and ZANU-PF. This foreign policy of 'quiet
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diplomacy' has therefore been a policy of 'constructive engagement'. President
Mbeki's attempts to get funding from Saudi Arabia to provide funding for
Zimbabwe's land reform programme, has been illustrative of South Africa's
mediation efforts. This policy of 'constructive enqaqement" however, has also
highlighted the ambivalent place of human rights in global politics. According to
this approach, human rights abusers are more likely to reform if they are treated
with a mixture of contact and limited sanction, rather than a blanket boycott or
embargo. This approach, however, has often drawn strong criticism since it has
been viewed as a justification of the pursuit of self-interest under dubious moral
circumstances. Johnston (2001: 21) highlights two concerns that should be kept
in mind when the principle of constructive engagement is evaluated. The first is
that constructive engagement is an inescapable principle since a position that
demands the boycott of all human rights abusers by all democratic states would
make international relations practically impossible. The second is that
constructive engagement does not give a state a 'blank cheque' for full contact
with abuser states, but a negotiable and graded programme of sanctions and
inducements (Johnston, 2001: 21). Rather than publicly criticising and
condemning Mugabe and ZANU-PF, the South African government's approach to
the escalating crisis in Zimbabwe has therefore been to take the route of 'quiet
diplomacy'. This approach has maintained that a hard line towards Zimbabwe will
not bring any positive results and that sanctions will not result in any positive
developments leading to the restoration of political sanity in Zimbabwe
(Makumbe, 2003: 37). Therefore, the South African government has argued that
it is not a viable option to force a solution onto Zimbabwe, since such a solution
would be rejected29 (Die Burger, 2003a: 4).
27 A South African military intervention in Zimbabwe to enforce a commitment to human rights,
has never been considered a viable option due to South Africa's focus on mediation and symbolic
gower which is consistent with its middle power position (Johnston, 2001: 3; Stremlau, 2003).
8 This term is attributed to Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to
describe the Reagan administration's policy towards apartheid South Africa (Johnston, 2001: 21).
29 According to official sources, Mbeki feels that he has little option but to support Mugabe since
Zimbabwe could descend into Shona-Ndebele strife if Mugabe loses power. The military power of
the war veterans and the support of Zimbabwe's army to Mugabe, also increases the likelihood of
a lapse into civil war if ZANU-PF loses power (Johnston, 2001).
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The various attempts made by South Africa and Nigeria to promote dialogue
between ZANU-PF and the MDC, however, collapsed prematurely and raised
questions about the success of constructive engagement. Despite meetings
between the South African and Zimbabwean ministers of Foreign Affairs to assist
the people of Zimbabwe in their strides toward national reconciliation
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003), South Africa failed to get Mugabe to
undertake any measures to resolve the political predicament that he finds himself
in. Despite the South African government's claims that these meetings will lay a
firm foundation for Zimbabwe's political and economic recovery, reconciliation
between the Zimbabwean government and the MDC is yet to be achieved
(Makumbe, 2003: 37).
In reaction to accusations that South Africa is following a foreign policy of 'silent
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, Dlamini-Zuma, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has
stated that the regional priorities of the government include stability in the region.
Dlamini-Zuma has claimed that Zimbabwe remains 'a great concern' for the
government and that the South African government has continued to engage the
Zimbabwe government whilst pointing out firmly and frankly where they disagree
with them. Dlamini-Zuma has argued, moreover, that South Africa has a
responsibility to avoid a complete collapse in Zimbabwe as well as a
responsibility to prevent the deterioration of life for ordinary Zimbabweans (Ie
Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 259). Despite numerous setbacks and the lack of
tangible results, Aziz Pahad has asserted that progress has been made in
Zimbabwe, even if it is only talks about talks (Die Burger, 2003a: 4). The
continuous denial that progress is being made, by MDC leader Morgan
Tsvangirai, however, has raised doubts about progress made.
Olivier (2003) states that the moral neutrality and indifference with regard to intra-
African politics has been particularly notable about Mbeki's foreign policy. This
foreign policy stance has arduously respected the sovereignty of African states
and has viewed judgement on their human rights records as unwarranted
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interference in their domestic affairs. Whilst Mbeki got deeply involved in the anti-
war campaign in the United States-Iraq confrontation, attempted to play a
mediator-role in Palestine and helped to bring peace to the DRC crisis; he has
followed a much more conservative role in his own region. His stance towards
the enfolding crisis in Zimbabwe and towards the many cases of blatant
autocratic mismanagement and undemocratic behaviour elsewhere in Africa, has
merely been that 'we claim no right to impose our will on any independent
country' (Olivier, 2003). South Africa's weakening commitment to human rights
advocacy in Africa has illustrated its desire to forge ties with Africa, in other
words to 'belong' in Africa. By attaching a higher priority to African solidarity than
to human rights advocacy, South Africa rises in esteem in the eyes of its fellow
African states. The importance of esteem in order to avoid other states'
disapproval will be explained in chapter four.
During the unfolding Zimbabwean crisis, however, President Mbeki has been
singled out for criticism. Although Mbeki leads the dominant country in Africa and
has been a member of the core group of African leaders that created and
promoted Nepad30, he has been notably reluctant to publicly condemn the
Mugabe government's behaviour (Maclean, 2003a). Both domestic and
international audiences expected Mbeki, as member of the Commonwealth, to
take a stand in favour of the rule of law, against the suppression of civil and
property rights and against the resort to violence. The failure to do so, it was
widely believed, would go against its attempts to promote human rights and
democracy (Johnson, 2001). It soon became evident, however, that Mbeki would
not publicly condemn Mugabe. Despite numerous appeals by Zimbabwe's
opposition, South African civil society and by the West that Mbeki follow a harder
line approach towards Mugabe's flouting of democratic norms, human rights and
30 Nigeria (Obasanjo), Algeria (Bouteflika), Senegal (Wade), and Egypt (Mubarak) have formed
the other member countries of Nepad's core group (Breytenbach, 2002).
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increasing authoritarianism, Mbeki has refused to openly condemn Mugabe's
behaviour.
Lack of transparency can be identified as one of the main points of critique
against South Africa's foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe. This lack of
transparency has been illustrated by President Bush's sudden endorsement of
South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' after his South Africa visit in July 2003 (Carroll,
2003). Whilst Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, warned Southern African
states just a month earlier that political unrest in Zimbabwe posed a threat to the
region's stability unless they pressured Mugabe to reform, Bush supported
Mbeki's stance after private talks. After these talks, Mbeki has announced that
they are in agreement about the urgency of addressing the political and
economic challenges of Zimbabwe. Mbeki has further stated that both states
urged the Zimbabwean government and the opposition to get together and that
these parties are in the process of discussing all issues. The opposition,
however, denied these claims and said that Bush has been misled. Morgan
Tsvangirai accused Mbeki of 'buying time' for Mugabe with assurances to Bush
that were 'without foundation' (Carroll, 2003).
Little, if any, effort has been made to explain what the exact goals of the
government's 'quiet diplomacy' are, and how it will be achieved (Mail and
Guardian, 2003f). This veil of secrecy has been aggravated by the government's
contradictory statements and actions. The lack of transparency surrounding
South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, moreover, has fuelled
perceptions that South Africa's 'silent diplomacy' is in fact condoning Mugabe's
behaviour. These perceptions have been fuelled by Mbeki's continuing friendly
relations with Mugabe, despite Mbeki's call for and end to military regimes in
Africa on January 8, 2000. (Johnson, 2001). The appearance of Mbeki, standing
hand-in-hand with Mugabe also strengthened domestic and international
perceptions that Mbeki is condoning Mugabe's actions (Johnson, 2001). South
Africa's acceptance of the 2002 presidential elections, moreover, has been
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perceived as a tacit endorsement of Mugbe's violent actions (Hamill, 2002). The
South African election observer mission described the election as 'legitimate' but
not necessarily 'free and fair'. The ANC endorsed this finding and Smuts
Ngnoyama, the ANC's spokesperson, described the election as a legitimate
expression of popular will and offered 'warm congratulations to ZANU-PF and
President Mugabe for a 'convincing majority win'. President Mbeki also declared
that 'the will of the people of Zimbabwe has prevailed'. These statements were
widely viewed as a betrayal of the very democratic and non-racial values
championed by the ANC throughout its own history (Hamill, 2002).
Contradictory statements and behaviour have also increased critique directed
against South Africa's foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe. Despite Mbeki's
proclamation at the African Mining Indaba in 2002 that national sovereignty
should no longer serve as a barrier behind which African governments could
hide, prominent ZANU-PF ministers were invited as special guests and were
warmly applauded at the ANC national party conference in Stellenbosch in early
2003 (Olivier, 2003). Statements by Dlamini-Zuma that 'Mugabe will never be
condemned' as long as the ANC is in power, and by ANC labour minister
Membathisi Mdladlana that South Africa has 'had a lot to learn' from Mugabe,
have contradicted Mbeki's statement (Olivier, 2003; Dempster, 2003). Rather
than condemning acts that violate democratic standards, moreover, the
Department of Foreign Affairs has only stated that things are done differently in
South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 2003a). Continued oil and electricity supply to
Zimbabwe, as well as the extension of a loan to guarantee a basic oil supply
(Johnston, 2001), has fuelled the view that South Africa condones Mugabe's
violations of human rights and democracy.
The failure of South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' to produce any tangible results has
exacerbated the staunch criticism directed at South Africa's policy. President
Mbeki's inability to convince Mugabe to stop the violence and return law and
order to Zimbabwe, has already become apparent after the failed Victoria Falls
69
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Summit of April 2000. During this summit, which was attended by presidents
Mbeki, Mugabe, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Joaquim Chissano of
Mozambique; Mugabe agreed to stop the violence and facilitate the withdrawal of
the war veterans from white farms. It soon became evident, however, that
Mugabe refused to stop the violence or restore the rule of law. Despite the fact
that Mugabe did not keep his end of the bargain, all three other presidents
continued to support him in public (Johnson, 2001). South Africa's inability to
exert any influence on Zimbabwe is underscored by Dlamini, Mills and
Grobbelaar's (2001) claim that South Africa has little if any influence on
Zimbabwe. They argue that the competitive rather than collaborative historic
relationship between the ANC and ZANU-PF has not been conducive to enhance
South Africa's influence over Mugabe. Mbeki's repeated claims that they are
helping to arrange an 'exit plan' for Mugabe, have been repudiated by statements
of Zimbabwean Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, that Mugabe will stay until
the end of his term in 2008.
As Zimbabwe plunged further into state-sponsored anarchy and repression, it
became apparent that South Africa's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' had few if any
tangible results (Hamill, 2002). During the run-up to the 2002 elections it was
clear that South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' failed to achieve its desired objective of
supporting a peaceful and stable Zimbabwe (Solomon, 2002: 151). Many
ordinary Zimbabweans have illustrated resentment against Mbeki's 'quiet
diplomacy' because they have failed to see any benefits arising out of South
Africa's intervention. As food shortages mounted and the potential for
widespread famine increased, Zimbabweans have become more frustrated over
what they perceive as South Africa's complicity with Mugabe's government
(Dempster, 2003). The exasperated Zimbabwean opposition has accused South
Africa of assuming a 'fence-sitting' position (Mail and Guardian, 2003c).
The South African government has also been accused thereof that their lack of
condemnation towards Mugabe has been influenced by the fact that they do not
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consider the MDC as a more viable alternative to ZANU-PF. The belief that
stability in Zimbabwe can only be achieved by a reformed ZANU-PF has thus
influenced South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Mbeki, therefore,
favoured a path of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe for fear of alienating the
ZANU-PF government and catapulting Zimbabwe into accelerated collapse that
would influence South Africa and the region in a negative way (Dempster, 2003).
This lack of trust in the MDC can be partly ascribed to its lack of experience in
governing a country, and to the uncertain motives of a group of people opposed
to ZANU-PF (Johnston, 2001). Some have argued that because Mbeki faces
opposition from COSATU domestically, another liberation leader toppled by a
union-based movement like the MDC (President Kaunda of Zambia was
ultimately toppled by a trade union-based opposition), could strengthen
COSATU's leverage (Johnston, 2001).
President Mbeki's continued reticence to condemn Mugabe's actions, and his
support for Mugabe as illustrated by Mbeki's appeals to end the suspension of
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, has received much criticism. The reluctance
of African Commonwealth leaders to criticise Mugabe, moreover, has led to a
split between the 'old' and 'new' Commonwealth members": This division
exposed continuing anti-colonial and even racial sensitivities among its
membership (McWilliam, 2003: 96, Die Burger, 2003b: 6). The reticence of
African leaders to criticise Mugabe, did not only lower the potential impact of the
Commonwealth on the Zimbabwean crisis, but also damaged the standing of
African Commonwealth members (McWilliam, 2003: 97).
31 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) took notice of the deteriorating political
scene in Zimbabwe for the first time in 2000, in the run-up to the elections. Despite Zimbabwe's
objections, CMAG sent a team of observers to Zimbabwe. Their report noted widespread violence
and intimidation in the campaign as well as procedural irregularities. The voting and counting was
however considered acceptable. Since the 2000 election, the Commonwealth has become
increasingly concerned at Mugabe's infringement of democratic norms, violation of human rights
and treatment of the press and courts (McWilliam, 2003: 96).
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In reaction to South Africa's appeals to end Zimbabwe's suspension from the
Commonwealth, fierce debates surrounding Zimbabwe's extended suspension
from the Commonwealth developed (McWilliam, 2003: 96). Following the critical
report by the Commonwealth observer group on the 2002 presidential elections,
the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, together with Australian Prime
Minister John Howard, constituted a troika in March 2002. Despite initial
indecision, the troika agreed on 19 March 2002 to suspend Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth for one year. This suspension did not trigger economic
sanctions, but was largely a symbolic punishment (The Economist, 2002b: 61). It
was also decided to meet in one year's time to assess the progress that was
made with regards to encouraging a peaceful outcome to the situation in
Zimbabwe (The South African Presidency, 2003).
The Commonwealth's decision on December 2003 to extend Zimbabwe's
suspension from the Commonwealth, and Mbeki's appeals to end this
suspension, have given rise to a huge outcry against Mbeki's 'approval' of
Mugabe. The strong criticism given by the other troika members - Nigeria and
Australia - has exacerbated the controversy surrounding South Africa's stance.
Whilst Nigeria stated firmly that it would not allow Mugabe to attend the troika
meeting in Nigeria (Mail and Guardian, 2003a), Prime Minister Howard asserted
that it is unacceptable to allow Zimbabwe to resume participation in
Commonwealth affairs until there is a complete change of approach, in other
words until Mugabe is removed from power (Mail and Guardian, 2003b).
South Africa's decision to support Mugabe in the Commonwealth, however, must
be understood within the context of its attempts to promote African solidarity.
Although South Africa received criticism from the rest of the world, it rose in
esteem in the eyes of its fellow African states that emphasise the norm of 'not
speaking out against each other'.
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SADe's initial reluctance to form a regional response to the crisis in Zimbabwe
and to take a stand against Mugabe's behaviour, has raised doubts as to the
effectiveness of this regional orqanisation'". Despite Mbeki's initiation of the
creation of a taskforce'" under the auspices of SADe to investigate the situation
in Zimbabwe, this taskforce has seemed reluctant to condemn Mugabe's flouting
of democratic norms, intimidations of his political opponents and occupation by
ZANU-PF's 'war veterans' of white-owned farms (Dashwaad, 2002: 98). Prior to
the Zimbabwean crisis, the effectiveness and credibility of SADe has already
been questioned". SADe's limitations as regional organisation have already
been illustrated by its inability to deal with the ORe crisis (Dashwood, 2002: 85).
The ORe's admission to SADe has also highlighted this organisation's inability to
develop a set of core 'democratic values' which are held to be prerequisites for
membership as opposed to a vague aspiration that democracy will be fostered as
a result of membership (Hamill, 2001: 41). Despite the draft protocol of the SADe
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security commitment to intervene in member
states if instability arises as a result of a breakdown in law and order (Johnson,
2001), the inability of SADe to stem instability and human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe has undermined its authority for enhancing security in the region.
The crisis in Zimbabwe has raised the profile of land reform for South Africa.
Although there has been an increase in militancy with the formation of the
Landless People's Movement and a series of actual or threatened land invasions,
it has not led to any fundamental changes in South Africa's market-based land
reform approach (Lahiff, 2003: 83). The South African government directed its
efforts towards assuring outside observers and investors that land reform, as it
took place in Zimbabwe, 'won't happen here'. The government has also insisted
32 See van Schalkwyk (2002: 64-66) for a discussion on the challenges facing the SADe Organ
for Politics, Defence and Security.
33 This team comprises South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique. The absence of Zimbabwe's
allies in the ORe intervention (Angola and Namibia) is not coincidental (Dashwood, 2002: 98).
34 Despite Ngoma's (2003: 17) claim that SADe is indeed moving towards a security community,
the general consensus has been that SADe has not achieved substantive gains in cooperation in
economic or security areas (Maclean, 2003a).
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that what the rural poor want in South Africa is not land but jobs and services.
Unlike Zimbabwe, South Africa has kept a firm hold on political power and
economic fundamentals to prohibit the creation of a land crisis (Lahiff, 2003: 83).
Therefore, despite the similarities in South Africa's land holding patterns, the
likelihood of a 'spill over' of 'farm invasions' into South Africa is small due to the
very different political and economic conditions that prevail in these two states
(Lahiff, 2003: 84).
Although South Africa does not seem to follow the same road as in Zimbabwe
regarding the land question, the events in Zimbabwe have had a negative impact
on South Africa's ANC. Despite South Africa's repeated assurances that rule of
law and the property rights will be maintained in South Africa, investor confidence
was shaken (Lahiff, 2003: 83). The South African business community was
enraged and the markets were thoroughly alarmed by Zimbabwe's adherence to
the principle of expropriation without compensation. Mbeki's failure to openly take
a stand against Mugabe conveyed a message that the ANC condoned this
behaviour and may even resort to such behaviour if faced with major electoral
challenge (Johnson, 2001). Although most analysts forecasted a strengthening of
the Rand for 2000 based on its undervalued purchasing power, the currency
went into free fall, ending the year with almost 25 percent below value ". The
South African Chamber of Business CEO, Kevin Wakeford, pleaded with the
government to take a position against Zimbabwe due to the extreme fall of
consumer confidence in 2000 (Johnson, 2001). Although business leaders rightly
highlight the skittishness of foreign investors, the extent to which funds were
withheld from South Africa due to its policy towards Zimbabwe is difficult to
discern. Sound economic policies, world economic trends and access to markets
35 The weakening of the Rand in 2000, when the Rand was at 17 to the dollar, was attributed to
South Africa's stance towards Zimbabwe. With the strengthening of the Rand in 2003, however,
no mention is made of South Africa's lack of condemnation on the Zimbabwe situation (Stremlau,
2003).
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are the factors that really count when deciding to invest (Stremlau, 2003). South
Africa's contradictory behaviour towards Zimbabwe, however, does not
strengthen investor confidence.
Another critique targeted against the South African government's approach of
'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, is the failure of the government to reflect
domestic interests. South Africa's political parties, churches and other
organisations all appealed to the government to take a stronger stance towards
Zimbabwe. After meeting with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU),
COSATU's provincial secretary Tony Ehrenreich linked COSATU'S call for
sanctions with sanctions against the apartheid regime. He stated that 'quiet
diplomacy' is not effective and that a new strategy should be followed (Mail and
Guardian, 2003c). Ehrenreich called on the South African government to end its
'silent' diplomacy in dealing with Zimbabwe and impose sanctions as a tool to
end the unjust government. The Democratic Alliance (DA) and the New National
Party (NNP) have also made calls for bold leadership from the South African
government in helping to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. DA leader Tony Leon
has been of the opinion that Mbeki's pledges and assurances in early 2003 that
dialogue between ZANU-PF and the MDC is making progress, is not bearing fruit
and a bolder stance is necessary (Mail and Guardian, 2003e). It is also felt that
Mbeki, as leader of the AU, has ample political leverage. It is maintained that
Mbeki had more than enough time and opportunity to create political dialogue in
Zimbabwe (Mail and Guardian, 2003e). The South African Communist Party has
also been in favour of a more hard line approach towards Zimbabwe. It maintains
that political freedom as non-negotiable should accompany South African
diplomatic efforts in Zimbabwe (Mail and Guardian, 2003d).
Perhaps the staunchest criticism of South Africa's Zimbabwe foreign policy has
been targeted against its undermining of the credibility of Nepad's African Peer
Review Mechanism. During the launching of the AU summit in Durban in 2002,
Mbeki urged Africa to proclaim to the world through its actions that 'Africa is a
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continent of democracy, a continent of democratic institutions and culture- indeed
a continent of good governance, where the people participate and the rule of law
is upheld' (Olivier, 2003). Mbeki's conscious decision to refrain from publicly
criticising Mugabe, however, has been viewed by many as a betrayal of the
entire human rights tradition of the South African liberation struggle (Johnson,
2001).
Nepad's African Peer Review Mechanism has exemplified Mbeki's fluctuating
attitude. This mechanism was originally designed to encourage African countries
'to consider seriously the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political
stability and economic growth, but also on neighbouring countries' (Olivier,
2003). It has been widely perceived, however, that the Zimbabwean issue fatally
undermined Nepad's credibility, only six months after its launch (The Economist,
2002b: 62). Even though not all of Africa's problems are of its own making, the
refusal of African leaders to get their own house in order has exacerbated
negative attitudes in the rest of the world (Taylor, 2002a). Presidents Mbeki of
South Africa and Obasanjo of Nigeria have effectively wasted the goodwill that
surrounded the Nepad at its initial launch (Taylor, 2003). The South African
government's reaction to Zimbabwe presented a severe blow to Pretoria's
international standing and to the state's post-1994 'aspiration to be an evangelist
for the expansion of democratic government on the African continent' (Hamill,
2002).
In order to gain a deeper understanding of South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, however, the role of norms must be taken into
account. The normative clash between African reluctance to 'speak out against
one another' and Western expectations to do the opposite (van der Westhuizen,
2004: 30), has placed South Africa in a difficult position concerning its reaction to
the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. The clash between the new norm of
human rights and the other, well-established norms of sovereignty and 'not
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speaking out against each other', has played itself out within Nepad. This, in turn,
has greatly impacted South Africa's foreign policy stance towards Zimbabwe.
Nepad's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), that is 'an instrument
voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self-
monitoring mechanism' attempted to institutionalise a process whereby African
states themselves will censure or praise states which conform to the governance
criteria of Nepad (van der Westhuizen, 2004: 26). This mechanism, however,
was perceived by African states as an extension of 'Western imperialism'. In
addition, the APRM advocated interference in fellow African states, which goes
against the norms of sovereignty and that of sovereign complicity (in other words
to refrain from acting 'against one's own') that is highly valued by most African
states. The introduction of a new norm 'whereby the practice of sovereignty is
reconstructed to allow limited degrees of peer sanctioned infringements',
apparently did not 'fit' with Africa's self-conceptualised identity (van der
Westhuizen, 2004: 26-27). The adoption of the new norm of human rights has
therefore been dependent on the rejection of the other, well-established norms of
sovereignty and 'not speaking out against each other'. In order to adopt the norm
of human rights, in other words, the norms of sovereignty and sovereign
complicity must be rejected. This, however, is easier said than done, since norms
are deeply ingrained and connected to identity.
Constructivism provides an understanding as to why South Africa was unable to
persuade African states to adopt human rights norms as propagated by Nepad.
Van der Westhuizen (2004: 4-8) argues that whilst Mbeki succeeded therein to
'sell' Nepad to the developed world, it failed to convince African states of its
significance. As illustrated by van der Westhuizen (2004: 4), 'framing' new norms
is essential to overcome extrinsic and intrinsic constraints. The minimum extrinsic
requirement is that an argument must be heard (securing an audience and the
assuring the credibility of the institution that advocates the norm), and intrinsic
barriers include the fit with dominant belief systems, notions of identity and social
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institutions. Van der Westhuizen (2004: 5) maintains that the potential receptivity
of a norm is enhanced when it fits with the normative practices and beliefs of the
actor; if the arguments are held to be congruent with the self-conceptualised
identity of the actor; and if the argument matches with existing social structures
that are a consequence of the belief systems through which societies are
ordered. By emphasising Nepad's efforts to promote good governance and
human rights, as well as its intention to off-set Africa's marginalisation by
establishing a partnership between the North and the South, Mbeki succeeded
therein to 'sell' Nepad to the Northern developed states (van der Westhuizen,
2004: 7-12). This success was attributed to Nepad's appeal to aspects of the
target's (the developed states) identity.
The inability of African states to condemn Mugabe's behaviour, has illustrated
that Africa was not (yet) ready to adopt these new norms of human rights and
'speaking out against each other' that were propagated by Nepad. What is
important to note, moreover, is that receptivity to ethical arguments is enhanced
by the degree to which arguments are held to be congruent with the self-
conceptualised identity of actors. New norms will only be adopted if '(the)
proposed norm better fits with the kind of people that they are or would like to
see themselves as' (van der Westhuizen, 2004: 5). The decision to move peer
review about political questions out of Nepad and under the auspices of the
African Union, illustrated that the norms of human rights and 'speaking out
against each other' did not yet reach a 'tipping point' in Africa, as suggested by
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895). It is therefore evident that a new norm of
'speaking out against the other' must be adopted before states will be held
accountable for their human rights issues (van der Westhuizen, 2004: 30).
This reluctance by African states to embrace the norms of human rights and
'speaking out against each other' has illustrated that conditions are not yet ready
to garner African support for a multilateral approach towards the enfolding crisis
in Zimbabwe. This, together with Africa's poor track record for successful
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multilateral responses to crises, has ruled out an African multilateral response to
Zimbabwe (Johnston, 2001: 14). Due to lessons learnt during the Nigerian fiasco,
it is very unlikely that South Africa will promote its human rights commitments
unilaterally.
South Africa's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe has also supported
a broader strategy of dealing with the paradox of South Africa's huge relative
power in Southern Africa. In dealing with Zimbabwe, as with other regional
situations, South Africa has to be careful not to alienate its neighbours and cause
them to form an alliance of self-defence against it (Stremlau, 2003). The potential
for an alliance of self-defence against South Africa has in turn been exacerbated
by the close historical ties among the militaries of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola
and Mozambique in their liberation struggle against South Africa. No close
historical ties exist with the South African National Defence Forces (SANOF),
which are still staffed by people who once served apartheid governments
(Dashwood, 2001: 85).
Leadership struggles in the Southern African region have also compelled South
Africa to take a cautionary approach towards Zimbabwe. During the DRC crisis,
Mugabe was able to garner support from Angola and Namibia to intervene on
behalf of Laurent Kabila in the DRC, despite South Africa's opposition. If South
Africa condemns Mugabe, therefore, a split can develop within SADC that will in
turn hamper regional cooperation that functions as a cornerstone of South
Africa's foreign policy (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 22; Dashwood, 2002: 80-87;
Stremlau, 2003).
To intervene in Zimbabwe on the grounds of human rights violations, moreover,
would violate state sovereignty, which is still respected as a guiding principle of
international law (Dugard, 2001: 235). State sovereignty is a much-valued
principle in Africa and violation of this principle by South Africa would receive
strong criticism from the rest of Africa (Olivier, 2003; Maclean, 2003a). A
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commitment to human rights, on the other hand, is not a rule of customary law
and therefore there is no obligation on states to enforce ie6 (Dugard, 2001: 27-
34). The advancement of human rights versus national sovereignty has emerged
as an important fault-line of post-Cold War international relations. Despite
SADC's attempt to overcome this divide by emphasising its commitment to both
human rights and sovereignty, there exists no clear-cut rule as what to do when
these principles clash. Swaziland, for instance, threatened to withdraw from
SADC when South Africa sent troops into the state in 1997 (Hamill, 2001: 40).
36 Since the international system as yet has no legislature or compulsory judicial system,
international custom (the common law of the international community) occupies a significant role
in the international legal order. A customary rule, however, is only created when there exists a
sense of obligation, a feeling on the part of the states that they are bound by the rule in question.
Despite the emerging consensus between states of the importance of protecting human rights,
the provisions adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nation's
General Assembly in 1948, had not become rules of customary international law (Dugard, 2001:
27- 34).
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3.4. Conclusion
The evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and President Mugabe's breach of human rights
and democratic standards have thus had a grave impact on South Africa's
international standing. Although President Mbeki's reticence to condemn
Mugabe's behaviour must be understood within the broader context of normative
influences, this policy of 'quiet diplomacy' still had a disastrous impact on South
Africa's foreign policy objectives and South Africa's international image.
This chapter has attempted to illustrate that South Africa's foreign policy stance
towards Zimbabwe has been complicated by South Africa's aspirations to playa
continental leadership role and evolving norms in the international system. The
lack of transparency in South Africa's quiet diplomacy, however, has given rise to
domestic and international criticism.
The recent crisis in the Commonwealth, and Mbeki's insistence that the crisis in
Zimbabwe is a crisis of land reform, received staunch criticism. Mbeki was
criticised for prioritising his relations with previous liberation partners above that
of a commitment to human rights and democratic standards. This tension created
within South African foreign policy as to its commitment to human rights
advocacy and African solidarity, has raised questions about South Africa's
foreign policy identity.
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Chapter Four
Constructivism as a framework to highlight South Africa's
contradictory foreign policy norms of human rights and African
solidarity
South Africa's political transition in 1994 did not only constitute a change of
domestic policy and government, but also a fundamental transformation of
political values, norms and structures of authority. This reconstituted domestic
regime was based on democracy, justice and the rule of law. It played a pivotal
role in reorienting, revitalising and reformulating the country's foreign policy
interests and practices, and its relations with the changing global order (Ie Pere &
van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 249). Commitment to upholding and strengthening
international norms associated with the United Nations formed a final strategy for
adapting South African foreign policy to the international realities of the post-Cold
War era. Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, the British Commonwealth
of Nations and the African Union have been indicative of South Africa's
commitment to international norms (Schraeder, 2001: 234).
The Mandela administration's commitment to the promotion of human rights as
'fundamental' foreign policy principle was especially prominent during the early
years of post-apartheid South Africa (Spence, 2001: 4). After the Nigerian
incident, however, South Africa turned to multilateral mechanisms as the main
vehicle for South Africa's commitment to human rights. The commitment to
multilateralism, however, has signified a decline in the priority placed on these
principles (Black, 2001: 88). The decline in the commitment placed on the
advocacy of human rights has become more prominent during the Mbeki
presidency. The focus placed on the importance of the foreign policy principles of
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security and wealth creation in 1999 reflected a dilution of the priority placed on
human rights. Although the commitment to the promotion of human rights has not
been abandoned altogether, human rights have come to be viewed as a second-
order priority.
South Africa's commitment to the African Renaissance has received extra
impetus by the Mbeki presidency and attempts to promote African solidarity have
accompanied this vision for African revival and rebirth. Accusations that South
Africa is merely acting according to Western interests and priorities with its
attempts to advocate the African Renaissance and Nepad, have compelled
South Africa to take a more public stand in favour of African solidarity.
South Africa's attempts to act as 'agent' and 'norm leader' in Africa by promoting
human rights and democracy have thus presented problems to the Mbeki
presidency. It became evident that its efforts to promote human rights on the one
hand, and African solidarity on the other, were not compatible foreign policy
interests in Africa, since the promotion of human rights required a rejection of the
norms of state sovereignty and 'not to speak out against each other'. The
seemingly incompatible commitments to human rights and African solidarity were
accentuated by South Africa's reticence to condemn President Mugabe's flouting
of democratic standards and increasing human rights violations and
authoritarianism. These conflicting demands, moreover, raised questions about
South Africa's foreign policy identity and interests.
The international relations theory of constructivism provides a useful framework
to gain a deeper understanding of South Africa's increasingly incompatible
commitment to both human rights and African solidarity. The importance of
norms in making sense of international relations has been illustrated by the end
of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid. These events have illustrated the
potential strength and influence of norms on state's behaviour. Audie Klotz
(1999: 166) argues that the global diffusion of a norm of racial equality motivated
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
domestic, transnational, state and intergovernmental actors to protest South
Africa's apartheid system of racial segregation. Due to the force of these norms,
the South African government abolished apartheid and made concessions to
universal-suffrage elections. It is because of the potential force of norms, as
illustrated by the demise of apartheid, that these norms and identity issues must
be taken into account when analysing South Africa's foreign policy of 'quiet
diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe.
The socialisation of South Africa to end apartheid illustrated that norms constrain
states' behaviour through reputation and group membership, and that norms
constitute states' definitions of their own identities and interests (Klotz, 1999:
167). Klotz (1999: 169) suggests that the claim that states are socialised into the
international system presumes a concept of identity. Since state identities do not
evolve autonomously in isolation from other actors, South Africa's post-apartheid
identity has not evolved in isolation either. Whilst some international pressures
(such as membership in the African Union and United Nations) have reaffirmed
South Africa's state-centric sovereign identity, other memberships (such as in the
Commonwealth) have promoted broader transnational and collective
commitments (such as a commitment to human rights and democracy) (Klotz,
1999: 171). These pressures from Western states that demand a commitment to
human rights on the one hand, and from African states that demand adherence
to the rule of sovereignty and 'not to speak out against each other' on the other,
have created foreign policy tensions within South Africa. The crisis in Zimbabwe
greatly accentuated these contradictory foreign policy interests in the African
context.
South Africa's post-apartheid diplomatic culture has reflected the fragmented
divisions within Africa surrounding the importance attached to human rights
issues. A division has existed in Africa between those states emphasising the
importance of promoting human rights (such as South Africa and Nigeria), and
those refusing to comply with international human rights standards (such as
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Zimbabwe and Liberia). This latter group has appealed to the principle of state
sovereignty when attempts have been made to hold them accountable for their
breach of human rights. These states in turn, have accused states such as South
Africa that demanded a commitment to human rights, of acting 'against one of
their own'. African states' outcry against the Mandela administration when it
recalled its High Commissioner from the Abacha regime in Nigeria, is a case in
point.
The debate surrounding Nepad's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has
also brought these conflicting norms of a commitment to human rights and 'not
speaking out against each other' to the fore. The decision to move the APRM out
of Nepad and under the remit of the African Union was indicative of the
'backseat' given to the norm of human rights within the African context and
illustrated that the norm of human rights has not yet reached a tipping point in
Africa. It is evident that a new norm of 'speaking out against the other' must be
adopted before states will be held accountable for their human rights issues.
Therefore, Mbeki's increasing appeals to African solidarity, as illustrated by his
leadership role in advocating the African Renaissance and Nepad, compelled
him to give a 'backseat' to the international norm of human rights. Whilst the
norm of a commitment to human rights is an international norm, it is not (yet) a
regional (African) norm.
Seen within this context, Mbeki's reticence to condemn Mugabe's violation of
human rights is not that surprising. A division between those in favour of a strong
commitment to human rights (even if it negatively impacted on solidarity with
African states) and those emphasising African solidarity (even if it negatively
impacted upon its commitment to human rights) existed within the South African
government. Despite various appeals by both the domestic and international
arena to the South African government to take a stronger stand against
Mugabe's violations of human rights and democracy, the government has
refused to condemn Mugabe's behaviour. It is argued that the South African
85
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
government realised that too strong a push for human rights in Africa will ruin its
attempts to promote African solidarity.
This contradiction between the norms of African solidarity and human rights has
been complicated by the status of human rights in the international system.
Despite the establishment of the Declaration of Human Rights by the United
Nation's General Assembly in 1948, human rights have not become rules of
customary international law. States, therefore, have no obligation to uphold these
norms and are not bound by the Declaration of Human Rights to intervene in
other states on the grounds of gross human rights violations. The principle of
sovereignty, on the other hand, is respected as a guiding principle of international
law. African states' claim on the sacrosanct status of sovereignty, therefore, is a
legitimate claim under international law.
South Africa's commitment to human rights, moreover, has brought some
sensitive issues to the fore. South Africa's human rights culture is expressed in
the South African constitution and is firmly based on the values of liberalism and
democracy. This Western orientation, however, has placed South Africa in a
difficult position as it has been viewed in the past as merely acting as a proxy for
Western interests in Africa. Although Africa does have a human rights regime, as
embodied in the African Commission on Human and People's rights, it is a weak
regime. Both the founding charters of human rights, and attempts to shape the
forms of democratisation in Africa have thus been dominated by Western powers
(Johnston, 2001: 23).
This dilemma is complicated by South Africa's links to the developed world, and
its desire to weld itself in the global economy in order to increase the welfare and
social security of its people (Olivier, 2003). Although Mandela stated since his
inauguration that South Africa was first and foremost an African country with
responsibilities on the African continent, the majority of South Africa's economic
and financial links have been with the major northern industrialised democracies.
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The question has thus arisen whether South Africa should primarily focus on
strengthening its links with the northern industrialised democracies, or whether
cultural solidarity demands a greater focus on the African continent (Schraeder,
2001: 241).
The controversy surrounding South Africa's initial strong stance against the
Nigerian Abacha regime accentuated this clash between human rights and
African solidarity. This incident, which played out against the backdrop of the
Commonwealth, placed South Africa's identity crisis at the fore. The question
arose whether South Africa is a leading country of Africa and the developing
world, or whether it is a 'White country with a Black president', as the then
Nigerian president Abacha cuttingly remarked. Using the Commonwealth as
forum, South Africa was accused thereof as acting as a proxy for Western
priorities and preferences. South Africa was thus charged with the accusation
that it is breaking norms of 'African solidarity' in turning in on one of its own
(Black, 2001: 83).
Ironically (or maybe as a consequence of the above controversy), South Africa
has been accused of the opposite during the recent crisis in the Commonwealth
over Zimbabwe's continued suspension. Whilst South Africa has been associated
with the Anglo-Saxon part of the Commonwealth during the Nigerian crisis, South
Africa has aligned itself with Zimbabwe during the Zimbabwean saga - to the
dismay of Britain and Australia. These states, consequently, have strongly
criticised South Africa's decision to side with Mugabe. South Africa's behaviour
has raised questions as to South Africa's commitment to human rights and
democratic standards.
These contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy identities have been
exacerbated by the controversies surrounding South Africa's advocacy of Nepad
and the African Peer Review Mechanism. Mbeki's promotion of Nepad has
advocated a 'new political will' by African leaders to embark upon good
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governance, free market principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law
(Olivier, 2003). Although Mbeki is the leader of Africa's strongest, most
democratic and most developed state, he has illustrated an unwillingness take a
strong and principled stand against Mugabe (Olivier, 2003). This behaviour has
refuted South Africa's commitments to human rights and democratic norms.
Mbeki's contradictory behaviour of propagating human rights and democracy on
the one hand, and his reluctance to criticise Mugabe on the other, can be
explained by focusing on norms as a potential transformative force. South
Africa's political transition in 1994 was an example of how international norms
were used to compel a state to adopt universal human rights norms (that of racial
equality in this case) in its domestic policies. After this success, the post-
apartheid South African government attempted to assume a position in Africa as
'norm leader' to advance human rights and democracy - as illustrated by the
leading role it has undertaken in advocating the African Renaissance and Nepad.
The crisis in Zimbabwe did not only accentuate the contradictions in South
Africa's foreign policy attempts to advocate both human rights and African
solidarity norms, but it has also raised questions about South Africa's identity.
South Africa's strong emphasis on the advocacy of human rights in the early post
apartheid years, raised questions over solidarity with Africa, since the advocacy
of human rights has been mainly associated with Western interests. On the other
hand, Mbeki's refusal to condemn Mugabe and his efforts to end Zimbabwe's
suspension from the Commonwealth, has raised questions about South Africa's
commitment to human rights.
The reluctance of Africa, however, to follow South Africa's lead in adopting these
norms became apparent soon after the launch of Nepad. This reluctance
illustrated that these norms have not yet reached the 'tipping point' in Africa, as
explained in the previous chapter. South Africa, and other norm entrepreneurs,
have not yet succeeded therein to persuade a critical mass of states to become
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norm leaders and adopt these new norms of human rights (Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998: 901).
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895-904) highlight that socialisation functions as
the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade whereby norm leaders persuade
others to adhere to the new norm. Whilst the exact motivations for this
'cascading' of norms through the rest of the international society differ, it is
argued that a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance
international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-
esteem, facilitates norm cascades. The concept of socialisation suggests that the
cumulative effect of many countries in a region adopting new norms may be
analogous to 'peer pressure' among states, since state and state elites fashion
an identity in relation to the international community. Conformity and esteem
involve evaluative relationships between states and their state 'peers', and this
conformity demonstrates that states 'belong', which in turn fulfils a psychological
need to be part of a group. Esteem, therefore, suggests that leaders of states
sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and
because they want to think well of themselves. State leaders' desire to gain or
defend their pride or esteem, and their conformity to norms in order to avoid the
disapproval aroused by norm violation, can thus explain norm following
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903-904).
States comply with norms for reasons that relate to their identities as members of
an international society. State identity, therefore, fundamentally shapes state
behaviour, and state identity, is in turn shaped by the cultural-institutional context
within which states operate. When enough states and enough critical states
endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behaviour for the identity called
'state', a tipping point is reached. As argued before, in South Africa's specific
cultural-institutional context the norms of human rights and state interference
have not yet reached a tipping point. In order to 'belong' within the African
context, South Africa thus had to take a backseat in promoting its human rights
89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
commitment. South Africa thus conformed to the norm of sovereignty and 'not to
speak out against each other' in order to defend its national pride and esteem,
and to avoid the disapproval of other African states. Mbeki's reluctance to
criticise the leader of another African liberation movement can also be explained
by its desire to 'belong' within the African continent. It can be argued that this
identity of 'liberation partners' increases South Africa's esteem in the African
continent, that South Africa has therefore been reticent to condemn President
Mugabe.
Constructivism's agency-structure debate provides a deep understanding of the
impact of South Africa's specific historical context on its foreign policy decisions.
By acting as a norm leader, the post-apartheid regime attempted to influence the
structure in which Africa is embedded by advocating the new norms of human
rights. However, instead of acting as agent and influencing the established
structure, the structure constrained South Africa's behaviour. South Africa
experienced pressure by both the African structure, that gives preference to the
norm of sovereignty, and the Western structure, that emphasises the prevalence
of human rights. This reciprocal influence, however, is a continuous process and
thus never-ending. The potential still exists that South Africa can obtain a critical
mass in Africa to adopt the norm of human rights - and thus influence the
structure to adopt new norms.
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